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ARTICLES
ISSUANCE OF THE KEYSTONE XL PERMIT:
PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVE OR
PRESIDENTIAL “CHUTZPAH”1
Hope M. Babcock*
“In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”2
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INTRODUCTION
President Trump’s issuance of a presidential permit for the Keystone
XL Pipeline in defiance of congressionally endorsed procedures set out in
governing executive orders and a statute incorporating those orders may
seem insignificant when compared to other examples of his dubious use of
presidential power, such as reprogramming congressionally appropriated
moneys to construct a wall at the country’s southwestern border.3 Nonethe-
less, it is as institutionally and constitutionally troubling as these more sub-
stantial presidential aggregations of power in what his actions say about his
lack of respect for Congress.4 Of dubious need, the Keystone XL Pipeline
may contribute unregulated and unassessed serious harms to the environ-
ment, as it will escape review under federal environmental laws designed to
protect the environment. This article does not take issue with the concept of
a presidential permit, but opposes its use to circumvent applicable laws
when, as here, Congress has affirmed procedures that would mandate that
review.
3. See Jonathan Stevenson, A Different Kind of Emergency, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, May 23, 2019,
https://perma.cc/P367-XJYU (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
4. See Jamie Raskin, Congress Isn’t Just a Co-Equal Branch. We’re First Among Equals, WASH.
POST, May 12, 2019, https://perma.cc/T6AV-RKVH (quoting Thaddeus Stevens “‘The sovereign power
of the nation rests in Congress, and its members stand around the president ‘as watchmen to enforce his
obedience to the law and the Constitution’”).
2
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This article uses President Trump’s issuance of the Keystone XL Pipe-
line permit to illustrate the dangers of an imperial presidency, one in which
the exercise of discretionary authority, based on neither the text of Article II
of the Constitution nor a statute, will in all likelihood be unchecked by
Congress, the courts, or popular opinion.5 To understand the dimensions of
this concern, Part I of this article briefly describes the process and require-
ments for a presidential permit. Part II identifies key facts surrounding issu-
ance of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit, the chronology of its issuance,
and commonly given reasons supporting or opposing the permit. Part II
includes a discussion of non-legal arguments favoring permit issuance, such
as its projected economic and national security benefits and the promotion
of beneficial relations with a border country, as well as those against its
issuance, such as its projected environmental harm and the dangerous pre-
cedent it may set as a way to avoid environmental accountability for presi-
dential activities that may have a significant adverse effect on the environ-
ment.
Part III looks more closely at the constitutional arguments justifying
the permit’s issuance, finding potential support in the President’s preroga-
tive powers as well as in his constitutionally assigned role as Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and Navy,6 his duty to oversee foreign relations,7 and
to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.8 Part IV identifies the
extent to which Article II cabins the President’s authority to issue the Key-
stone XL Pipeline permit and how its issuance may violate the separation of
powers doctrine. The arguments that the courts, Congress, and the public
will check any abuse of power by the President and that this use of presi-
dential power is supported by precedent are set out in Part III and then
critiqued in Part IV.
The last part of the article, Part V, broadens the perspective on the
issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit. More specifically, the Part
discusses how its issuance reflects an accretion of presidential power and
questions the wisdom of potentially unbalancing the balance of powers be-
tween the two branches of government in the current political environment.
Much of the Part’s discussion centers on then–Professor Elena Kagan’s9
5. John P. Roche, Executive Power and Domestic Emergency: The Quest for Prerogative, 5 W.
POL. Q. 592, 593 (1952) (asking “[t]o what extent does an analysis of the American constitutional
tradition buttress the assertion that there is, incorporated in the initial phraseology of Article II of the
Constitution, an independent grant of executive power?”).
6. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
7. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
8. Id. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
9. Professor Kagan became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court following her confirmation
by the United States Senate on August 5, 2010.
3
Babcock: Issuance of the Keystone XL Permit
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2020
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON102.txt unknown Seq: 4 31-MAR-20 9:31
8 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 81
strong support for a dominant president, what she calls a “presidential ad-
ministration,”10 and those who disagree with that idea.
The article concludes the President may have stepped beyond the lim-
its of his Article II enumerated and discretionary constitutional powers by
issuing the Keystone XL Pipeline permit. In treading on Congress’ constitu-
tional authority, President Trump’s action risks the creation of an uncheck-
able imperial presidency, beyond even what Justice Kagan envisioned. This
type of presidency may do serious permanent damage to the constitutional
structure of our government, outlasting, in the specific situation, President
Trump’s days in office.
I. THE PIPELINE APPROVAL PROCESS
The route of the Keystone XL Pipeline, which crosses the United
States-Canadian border, triggers the need for a presidential permit.11 Until
recently, two executive orders governed the presidential permitting process
for cross-border facilities, like pipelines.12 These orders were still in effect
when President Trump issued the permit for the pipeline. President Lyndon
B. Johnson issued the first of these, Executive Order 11,423, in 1968. It
stated “the proper conduct of the foreign relations of the United States re-
quires that executive permission be obtained for the construction and main-
tenance at the borders of the United States of facilities connecting the
United States with a foreign country, including pipelines, conveyer belts,
and similar facilities for the exportation or importation of petroleum and
petroleum products.”13 E.O. 11,423 identified the Department of State
(“State Department”) as the agency tasked with the job of implementing the
“presidential permit program for specified cross-border facilities, including
oil pipelines.”14
Although other permits are required for pipelines once in the United
States, and the State Department’s authority to issue presidential permits is
restricted to border areas and nearby facilities, because the State Depart-
ment’s approval of cross-border pipelines is “the lynchpin necessary for the
pipeline project to move forward within the United States,” it has assumed a
“lead role in much of the reviewing process,”15 which involves about a
10. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
11. Edwin Slade, The Keystone Pipeline Addition: Assessing the Potential Benefits of Reduced
Gasoline Prices and Increased National Security, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 27, 32 (2012).
12. President Trump rescinded both these executive orders with the issuance of E.O. 13,867 on
April 10, 2019. Exec. Order No. 13,867, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,491, 15,492 (April 10, 2019).
13. Kathy Parker, Keystone XL: Reviewability of Transboundary Permits in the United States, 24
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 243 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Presidential Exit, 67 DUKE L.J. 1729, 1753 (2018).
15. Slade, supra note 11, at 32. R
4
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dozen federal agencies, affected states, and their agencies.16 President
Trump explained he rescinded this executive order and E.O. 13,337 because
the review process set out in those orders “unnecessarily complicated the
Presidential permitting process, thereby hindering the economic develop-
ment of the United States and undermining the efforts of the United States
to foster goodwill and mutually productive exchanges with it neighboring
countries.”17
President George W. Bush issued the second Executive Order, E.O.
13,337, in 2004, amending E.O. 22,423 only with respect to cross-border oil
pipeline facilities. It required “the State Department to issue a presidential
permit ‘if the Secretary of State finds that issuance of a permit to the appli-
cant would serve the national interest.’”18 E.O. 13,337 amended E.O.
11,423 by adding the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to the list
of agencies the Secretary of State must consult and requiring those agencies
to respond to the Secretary of State within 90 days of receiving the informa-
tion they need to review the applications.19 The process called for the Sec-
retary of State, after he received the “views” of the designated officials, to
“issue or deny a permit based on a National Interest Determination
(“NID”).”20 “While there are no official requirements that the Secretary of
State must follow when making an NID, the Department of State considers
factors from previous NID determinations and any other factors that are
relevant to the project.”21 Among the factors the State Department consid-
ered in the NID were the project’s environmental impacts, potential diversi-
fication of the country’s oil supply, the project’s economic benefits, and
broader foreign policy goals, like climate change.22
The decision on the permit lay within the Secretary of State’s discre-
tion,23 but any agency the Secretary of State was required to consult could
ask that the President make the final decision.24 Thus, E.O. 13,337 author-
ized the State Department to issue a presidential permit for a cross-border
16. Id. The Executive Order requires the Secretary of State to request the views of several agency
heads, including, but not limited to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
Secretary of the Interior. Id.
17. Exec. Order No. 13,867, 84 Fed. Reg. at 15,491.
18. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 14, at 1753. R
19. Slade, supra note 11, at 32; see also Parker, supra note 13, at 243. R
20. Slade, supra note 11, at 32–33. R
21. Id. at 33.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also Joan Campau, Note, Presidential Permitting for Pipelines: Constitutionality and
Reviewability, 8 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 273, 290 (2018) (stating “courts have found that either
the State Department’s actions are not ‘final’; that it was in fact the ‘president’ (rather than an ‘agency’)
who acted; or both”).
5
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facility, but the final decision to issue a permit was retained by the Presi-
dent whenever another agency disputed the Secretary of State’s decision.25
The combined effect of the two executive orders was “to designate and
empower the Secretary of State to receive permits ‘for the construction,
connection, operation, or maintenance, at the borders of the United States,
of facilities for the exportation or importation of petroleum, petroleum
products, coal, or other fuels to and from a foreign country.’”26 Collec-
tively, E.O. 11,423 “established a default rule that no oil pipeline may cross
into the United States without a presidential permit”; while E.O. 13,337
“imposes a high burden on pipeline applicants to convince the State Depart-
ment that the border crossing would serve the national interest,” on top of
which “the State Department has imposed rigorous environmental and other
assessment steps in connection with satisfying that burden.”27
E.O. 11,423 cited the “‘proper conduct of the foreign relations of the
United States’” as the President’s source of authority for permit issuance;
E.O. 13,337 relied on both the “‘Constitution and the Laws of the United
States of America, including Section 301 of title 3, United States Code.’”28
Section 301, in turn, authorizes the President to delegate his permitting au-
thority in any matter to “the head of any department or agency of the execu-
tive branch.”29 While neither the Constitution nor Congress directly grants
the President the power to regulate commerce, “the President’s ‘inherent’
authority in the area has long been recognized.”30 Thus, the Secretary of
State’s authority to issue presidential permits is based on both the Presi-
dent’s inherent “authority to regulate foreign commerce and on the Presi-
dent’s statutory authority to delegate his authority.”31
The State Department’s process of issuing a presidential permit was
comprehensive and “straightforward.”32 The State Department prepared an
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), followed by a determination by
25. Parker, supra note 13, at 238. R
26. Id. at 243–44.
27. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 14, at 1755. R
28. Id. at 1753 (stating “Executive Order 11423 references no specific constitutional or statutory
authority, asserting instead that ‘proper conduct of the foreign relations of the United States requires that
executive permission be obtained for the construction and maintenance at the borders of the United
States of facilities connecting the United States with a foreign country’”); Parker, supra note 13, at 244 R
(noting that whereas E.O. 11423 cites only the “proper conduct of the foreign relations of the United
States” as a source of authority, E.O. 13337 cites the “Constitution and the Laws of the United States of
America, including Section 301 of title 3, United States Code”).
29. Parker, supra note 13, at 244. R
30. Id.
31. Id.; but see Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 14, at 1758 (providing “Indeed, President Trump’s R
executive order did not expressly reference the Antiquities Act as its authority, declaring instead that is
it based on ‘the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States
of America’”).
32. Parker, supra note 13, at 244–45. R
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State whether the project is “within the national interest.”33 Although E.O.
13,337 did not specifically require that the State Department comply with
the National Environmental Policy Act34 (“NEPA”),35 the State Depart-
ment’s NID rules include consideration of environmental factors,36 and the
State Department’s internal regulations require a review of the environmen-
tal impacts of its proposed actions.37
As part of its NID determination, the State Department considered
“many factors including energy security; environmental, cultural, and eco-
nomic impacts; foreign policy; and compliance with relevant federal regula-
tions.”38 E.O. 13,337 paragraph (b)(ii) required that the State Department
consults with eight federal agencies, including the Departments of Energy,
Transportation, Justice, Interior, Commerce, and the EPA before making
any decision about the permit.39 Depending on the outcome of those con-
versations, the Secretary of State issued a decision that outlined whether the
project was within the national interest, and granted or denied the permit.40
Paragraph (i) of E.O. 13,337, required the Secretary of State to refer the
application “to the President for consideration and a final decision” on the
permit, if any reviewing agency disagreed with the Secretary of State’s
findings.41 Reviewing agencies had 15 days to register their disagreement
with the Secretary of State’s findings.42 Under the regime in place when
President Trump issued the Keystone XL Pipeline permit, this was the only
presidential involvement in the permitting process and even then, such in-
volvement only arose under very limited circumstances.43
Thus, the two rescinded executive orders not only delegated presiden-
tial permitting authority to the State Department, but also established the
33. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–4335 (2018).
35. Slade, supra note 11, at 33 (stating “Along with evaluating the NID factors, the Secretary must R
ensure compliance with other relevant federal laws. DOS reviews compliance with the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (‘NEPA’), the National Historic Preservation Act (‘NHPA’), the Endangered Spe-
cies Act (‘ESA’), and Executive Order 12,898, addressing environmental justice”); see also Campau,
supra note 24, at 278–79. R
36. Parker, supra note 13, at 244–45. R
37. Campau, supra note 24, at 278–79. R
38. Parker, supra note 13, at 244 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). R
39. Id. at 244–45.
40. Id. at 245.
41. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
42. Campau, supra note 24, at 279 (citing Issuance of Permits With Respect to Certain Energy- R
Related Facilities and Land Transportation Crossings on the International Boundaries of the United
States, Exec. Order No. 13,337, 69 Fed. Reg. 25229 (2004)).
43. But see Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 14, at 1754 (stating “[t]he reality of presidential permits R
for oil pipelines is that they are presidential permits. The president issues them through the State Depart-
ment, but Executive Order 13,337 explicitly provides that the president retains the authority to make the
final decision on whether or not to issue the presidential permit. Environmental assessment laws such as
NEPA and the ESA apply to federal agencies, but do not apply to the president acting as the president”).
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“framework under which major federal review of oil pipelines occurs.”44
That framework only involved the President in the permitting process when
there was a conflict between the State Department’s findings and the find-
ings of a reviewing agency. In the case of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit,
which was issued under the now-rescinded executive orders, since there
was no request to forward the Secretary of State’s decision to deny the
permit to the President before President Trump acted, the decision on the
permit’s issuance remained with the Secretary of State. However, since the
executive orders were only a delegation of presidential authority with re-
spect to the issuance of cross-border permits for energy facilities, the Presi-
dent can, and indeed did retract them.45 However, they were still in effect
when the Keystone XL Pipeline permit was issued by the President in viola-
tion of their terms.
II. BACKGROUND ON ISSUANCE OF KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE
PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT
A. Facts
“The Keystone pipeline system consists of existing and proposed pipe-
lines and related facilities that will carry crude oil from the tar sands in the
West Canadian Sedimentary Basin” in Alberta, Canada “to refining markets
in the United States.”46 The pipeline will directly connect Canadian oil with
refineries on the Gulf Coast of the United States, picking up domestic
United States product from Montana and North Dakota oil fields in the
Bakken formation.47 The Keystone XL Pipeline will “enter the United
States at Phillips County, Montana, continue through South Dakota and
much of Nebraska, before ending at Steele City,” Nebraska.48
The Keystone XL Pipeline is actually “a two-part proposed extension
and expansion of the existing Keystone pipeline system.”49 The original
Keystone pipeline is owned by TransCanada Energy (“TransCanada”). It
opened in June 2010 and has the capacity to carry about “591,000 barrels
per day of crude tar sands oil from the Alberta oil sands to refineries in
Illinois and Oklahoma.”50 Keystone XL, also owned by TransCanada, is the
second part of the system and “is a 1,179-mile proposed pipeline from Har-
disty, Alberta to Steele City, Nebraska.”51 In Nebraska, the pipeline will
44. Campau, supra note 24, at 274. R
45. Parker, supra note 13, at 245. R
46. Slade, supra note 11, at 29. R
47. Id. at 31.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 30.
50. Parker, supra note 13, at 234. R
51. Slade, supra note 11, at 31. R
8
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combine with an existing segment of the original Keystone pipeline, which
connects to a hub in Cushing, Oklahoma.52 From Cushing, parts of the new
extension will transport the “oil to two delivery points in Port Arthur,
Texas.”53
The Keystone XL Pipeline, when built, will “create a more direct link
between Canadian oil fields and U.S. refining markets than the existing
Keystone pipeline.”54 On its way to Steele City, the Keystone XL Pipeline
may also connect to pipelines coming from oil fields in the Bakken forma-
tion in Montana and North Dakota. The planned new pipeline will carry an
additional 830,000 barrels of oil per day to delivery points in Oklahoma and
Texas at a construction cost of approximately seven billion dollars.55 The
pipeline is projected to “increase Canadian oil exports to the United States
by approximately four percent” of current United States demand for oil.56
B. Chronology
In September of 2008, TransCanada filed an application for a presiden-
tial permit with the State Department to build and operate the Keystone XL
Pipeline.57 The application covered the construction, connection, operation,
and maintenance of oil pipeline facilities on the United States–Canadian
border in Phillips County, Montana.58
As a federal agency that was proposing to approve a project that might
have a significant environmental impact, the State Department had to com-
ply with NEPA, which meant preparing an EIS on TransCanada’s applica-
tion for a presidential permit.59 In the case of the Keystone XL Pipeline, the
“EIS process was extensive.”60 The agency consulted with “eight other fed-
eral agencies, as well as numerous state agencies and Indian tribes, [the
State Department] conducted twenty scoping meetings in communities
along the pipeline route, and then [held] twenty-one public comment meet-
ings about the draft EIS.”61 As part of the approval process, the State De-
52. Parker, supra note 13, at 234. R
53. Id.
54. Slade, supra note 11, at 31. R
55. Parker, supra note 13, at 234; see also Slade, supra note 11, at 31. R
56. Parker, supra note 13, at 234. R
57. Slade, supra note 11, at 31. R
58. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 14, at 1752. R
59. Slade, supra note 11, at 33. R
60. Id.
61. Id.; see also Id. at 33–34 (stating “[w]ithin the United States, the Department of Transporta-
tion’s Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (‘PHMSA’) is responsible for pipeline
construction, maintenance, and general regulations.”); Id. at 34 (noting “each state has the ultimate legal
authority to approve pipeline construction within its state, including having final say over the route”).
9
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partment compelled TransCanada to “adopt project-specific special condi-
tions.”62
In November 2011, citing concerns about “Nebraska’s lack of a regu-
latory framework for determining pipeline routes and national concern
about the pipeline’s proposed route over the Ogallala aquifer,” the State
Department put off its decision on the application until after the 2012 presi-
dential election.63 The State Department wanted “to examine in-depth alter-
native routes that would avoid the Sand Hills in Nebraska” before moving
forward with a NID for the permit.64 Showing its impatience with the pro-
cess, in 2011, Congress added a provision to a temporary payroll tax cut bill
that gave the Obama administration 60 days to decide whether it was going
to approve the presidential permit for the pipeline.65 Obviating the need for
further environmental review, the legislation stated that if the presidential
permit was approved, its approval would constitute compliance with NEPA,
even if there were any future changes to its route.66 The State Department
expressed its displeasure with the proposed legislation, saying it would
cause the State Department to be out of compliance with NEPA.67
The State Department had spent nearly three years preparing its final
environmental impact statement (“FEIS”) for the project. They had held 20
scoping meetings to identify the potential environmental impacts the EIS
should address, as well as consulted with federal and state agencies and
Indian tribes, and conducted various public meetings to discuss the draft
environmental impact statement (“DEIS”) in communities that might be af-
fected by the pipeline’s route. The State Department prepared a supplemen-
tal DEIS (“SDEIS”) to address concerns raised by EPA during the review
process, received comments from the public and EPA on the SDEIS,68 and
held yet more public meetings.69
After completing the EIS, the State Department began its NID analy-
sis. The State Department was on a path to complete the NID and make a
62. Id. at 33.
63. Parker, supra note 13, at 236. Prior to that, in July 2010, the EPA told the State Department that R
its EIS was inadequate and unduly narrow. The State Department postponed its final decision to give
agencies more time to comment before a final assessment was released. Caitlin McCoy et al., Keystone
XL Pipeline, Harvard Law School Environmental & Energy Law Program State Power Project (Feb. 13,
2018), https://perma.cc/VS58-FXF8.
64. Slade, supra note 11, at 35. R
65. Parker, supra note 13, at 237. R
66. Slade, supra note 11, at 35–36. R
67. Id. at 36.
68. The State Department received over 280,000 comments on the supplemental draft EIS. Id. at
34.
69. Parker, supra note 13, at 246. A subsequent review by the Inspector General cleared the various R
parties involved in the EIS preparation process of any conflicts, but found that the State Department’s
“limited technical resources, expertise, and experience impacted the implementation of the [review]
process.” Id. at 237.
10
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decision about the project by the end of 2011, but the outcry from the envi-
ronmental community and “Nebraskans concerned about the pipeline’s
route through the fragile Sand Hills region of Nebraska,” persuaded the
agency not to make a decision.70 After Congress passed a bill, in December
2011, accelerating its NID process, the State Department recommended
President Obama deny the permit, which he did in January 2012, saying
there was not sufficient time to review the project.71 TransCanada resubmit-
ted the application for a presidential permit on May 4, 2012 and agreed to
supplement the application with any alternative routes states like Nebraska,
given its concerns about the Sand Hills, might propose.72 The application
shortened the pipeline’s length to 875 miles, avoided crossing the sensitive
area of the Sand Hills as well as shortened the length of the pipeline cross-
ing the Northern Plains Aquifer system which included the Ogallala forma-
tion.73 Congress passed bills approving construction of the pipeline in the
winter of 2015, which President Obama vetoed on the ground that the Exec-
utive Branch, not Congress, had approval authority, which the Senate was
unable to override.74 On November 6, 2015, the Obama Administration of-
ficially rejected the project “saying it [did] not serve the nation’s interest.”75
And there matters stood until the 2016 presidential election.
Candidate Donald J. Trump vowed to reverse the State Department’s
recommended decision.76 Within days of taking office, now President
Trump, “issued a presidential memorandum directing the State Department
to revisit the matter.”77 On March 24, 2017, the State Department an-
nounced issuance of the permit with President Trump’s approval, and “im-
mediately became embroiled in litigation challenges.”78
70. Slade, supra note 11, at 34–35. R
71. Parker, supra note 13, at 237; see also Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 14, at 1752 (“Ultimately, R
after long delay, President Obama announced his agreement with Secretary of State John Kerry’s deci-
sion to deny the permit”). He, however, endorsed the construction of the southern segment (Phase III) of
the project from Cushing, Oklahoma, to the Gulf. TransCanada later severed Phase III in its May 2012
application, deciding to proceed with it as a separate project. Phase III was completed in January 22,
2014 and began pumping oil to Port Arthur, Texas. McCoy et al., supra note 63. R
72. Slade, supra note 11, at 36. R
73. McCoy et al., supra note 63. R
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 14, at 1752. R
77. Id. On January 24, 2017 President Trump signed an executive order to expedite approval of
both the Keystone XL and Dakota Access Pipeline. McCoy et al., supra note 63. R
78. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 14, at 1752–53; See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive R
Relief, Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 317 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (D. Mont. March 27,
2017) (No. 4:17-cv-00029-BMM). In response to a motion to dismiss and summary judgment briefing,
the district court vacated State Department’s decision to issue the 2017 permit and enjoined the govern-
ment and TransCanada from undertaking any pipeline construction activities, although the district court
later allowed to company to undertake limited preparatory work. See Order, Indigenous Envtl. Network
v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 317 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (D. Mont. Nov. 8, 2018) (No. 4:17-cv-00029-BMM),
11
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On March 29, 2019, President Trump, through the Office of his Press
Secretary, issued a presidential permit granting TransCanada permission to
“construct, connect, operate and maintain pipeline facilities” extending 1.2
miles from the international border between Canada and the United States
for the import of Canadian oil into the United States.79 The language of the
permit authorizes the pipeline’s construction across approximately 45 miles
of lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management. Simultaneously,
President Trump revoked the 2017 permit issued by the State Department,
mooting pending litigation against that permit.80 “A review process for the
pipeline expansion that had taken several years under President Obama was
finalized in just months under President Trump.”81 On March 29, 2018,
President Trump issued a new permit for the Keystone XL Pipeline.
On April 10, 2019, a week after issuing the Keystone permit, President
Trump issued E.O. 13,867 requiring the review of cross-border infrastruc-
tural permit applications be completed within 60 days of receipt of an appli-
cation and revoking E.Os. 13,337 and 11,423.82 The new procedures gave
the President sole authority to issue, deny or amend a permit and eliminated
language in prior executive orders that the review process conducted by the
Secretary of State should be consistent with existing laws.83
“Major permitting applications that languished for several years under
review in the Obama Administration (such as the Alberta Clipper and Key-
stone XL lines) were approved within the first twelve months of the 45th
President’s tenure in office.”84 Although the basis for President Obama’s
denial of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit was inadequate time for its re-
view, President Trump, in his first week in office had invited TransCanada
to reapply and directed the State Department to make its decision on the
application within 60 days, suggesting the State Department use, to “the
‘maximum extent permitted by law,’ the existing Final Supplemental Envi-
appeal filed; see also Supplemental Order Regarding Permanent Injunction, Indigenous Envtl. Network
v. U.S. Dep’t of State, (D. Mont. Dec. 7, 2018) (No. 4:17-cv-00029-BMM), appeal filed.
79. See Authorizing TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., To Construct, Connect, Operate, and
Maintain Pipeline Facilities at the International Boundary Between the United States and Canada, 84
Fed. Reg. 13,101, 13,101–03 (April 3, 2019).
80. Id. At that point, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and the Fort Belknap Indian Community had litiga-
tion pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana challenging the State Department’s
decision to issue a permit for the pipeline, alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, the
National Environmental Policy Act, and the National Historic Preservation Act. McCoy et al., supra
note 63. R
81. Campau, supra note 24, at 277. R
82. Exec. Order No. 13,867, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,491, 15,491–92 (April 10, 2019).
83. Although maintaining that it did not have to supplement its NEPA analysis as the U.S. District
Court for the District of Montana required because of the new presidential permit for the project, it will
do so anyway. McCoy et al., supra note 63. R
84. Campau, supra note 24, at 275. R
12
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ronmental Impact Statement (“FSEIS”) and supporting documentation to
comply with environmental regulations.”85
C. Reasons Commonly Given to Support or Oppose
the Keystone XL Pipeline
The overall assessment by many scholars who have looked at the pro-
posed pipeline’s cost and benefits is that the environmental costs will ex-
ceed any benefits it might bring, such as reduced gas prices, improved na-
tional security, or new domestic jobs—the benefits cited by the project’s
proponents.86 But, it is unlikely the pipeline will decrease gas prices be-
cause oil that is now collecting in the Midwest and keeping prices low in
that region will thin out once it’s transported to the Gulf coast where refin-
eries are planning to export Canadian oil at higher prices and any oil not
exported will be sold back to United States markets at higher prices.87
World oil prices will not decrease in response to any increase in Canadian
oil production because the amount of that increase is insignificant in rela-
tion to the amount of oil used worldwide.88 And Canada’s intent to make
money is clear from shipping its oil to the Pacific Coast where the price will
be determined by the world oil market and not at any discounted rate.89
With respect to enhanced national security, it is true that
“[g]eopolitical factors dictate that the United States is less vulnerable to
disruptions in oil supply from Canada” because Canada and the United
States are engaged in the largest and most widespread trading relationship
in the world, and the United States has broader defense arrangements with
Canada than with any other nation.90 Moreover, Canada is “a staunch ally
of the United States.”91 However, the argument that the Keystone XL Pipe-
line will increase national security by improving energy security because
Canadian oil will replace United States imports from unstable countries,
like Venezuela, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia, assumes Canadian oil will actu-
ally replace oil from those countries.92
Even if the Keystone XL Pipeline is not built, the United States will
probably still use Canadian oil as a replacement for its foreign imports from
85. Id. at 275–76.
86. See e.g. Slade, supra note 11, at 36; but see Parker, supra note 13, at 234 (“Connecting the tar R
sands oil in Canada to refineries in Oklahoma and Texas would provide new resources for markets on
the East Coast. It also could increase the amount of refined petroleum products available for export”).
87. Slade, supra note 11, at 48. R
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 52.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 48–49. This also assumes that Canadian imports will reduce what is known as the oil
vulnerability premium.
13
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Venezuela and Mexico.93 These imports are declining as production in
those countries declines.94 United States’ demand for refined oil products,
like gasoline and diesel, is also declining.95 Both market reactions are inde-
pendent of United States domestic production or Canadian imports. Declin-
ing imports from other countries and declining domestic demand means
existing Canadian crude oil imports are already set to meet United States’
demand for oil without the additional product from the Keystone XL Pipe-
line.96 Since United States’ demand for refined oil products has little to no
effect on domestic production, in a declining market, or Canadian imports,
any decrease in demand for gasoline, and thus crude, would result in a de-
crease in imports from countries other than Canada, like those in the Middle
East.97 But, the United States will remain “vulnerable to expected oil dis-
ruptions from the Middle East because the Middle East holds the majority
of the world’s oil reserves,”98 on which the rest of the world still depends
with the result that “the global pricing markets will continue to keep the
United States vulnerable to disruptions,”99 regardless of an increase in im-
ports of Canadian crude.
Offsetting these somewhat dubious economic and national security
benefits are potential costs from building the Pipeline. “[P]ipelines are ex-
pensive, long term investments; they affect the availability of oil; they im-
plicate property rights; and they can pose risks to wildlife through climate
change, habitat disruption, and spills.”100 Critics complain that “the costs to
the environment, like carbon emissions, the hazards of oil extraction, and
the potential for oil spills, are too great.”101 They are concerned the pipeline
might leak oil in sensitive ecosystems like the Sand Hills of Nebraska, that
tar sand extraction is itself environmentally destructive, that the production
of tar sands oil will increase the industry’s carbon footprint, and the propo-
sal does nothing to reduce this country’s reliance on using fossil fuels to
93. Id. at 50.
94. Id.
95. See also Id. (“Using a realistic model of decreasing U.S. demand, in which vehicle efficiency
increases and the United States consumes less oil, EnSys projects that U.S. imports from Canada are the
same with or without the Keystone pipeline addition, assuming there is some pipeline expansion”).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 52.
99. Id.
100. Campau, supra note 24, at 275. R
101. Slade, supra note 11, at 37; see also Parker, supra note 13, at 235 (noting “[o]thers oppose the R
pipeline because it encourages development of tar sands in Canada. This requires a notoriously dirty
process that, compared with standard oil development processes, will disproportionately contribute to
climate change”).
14
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meet its energy needs.102 Moreover, the owner of the pipeline, TransCan-
ada, has an unfortunate record of spills associated with its other pipelines,
which provides some justification for project opponents who fear the “risk”
of an “environmental disaster, such as catastrophic spills that would damage
land, surface water, and groundwater.”103 Other opponents of the pipeline,
including some states and individuals, “oppose the pipeline” because its
construction raises states’ rights and individual property rights issues.104
Understanding that this country’s energy security will not necessarily
improve as a result of the construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline and that
oil prices will not necessarily decrease while serious environmental
problems may occur tips the pipeline’s cost-benefit balance against con-
struction.105 However, the factual assertions on each side of the equation
are less than firm.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALES SUPPORTING ISSUANCE OF THE
KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE PERMIT BY THE PRESIDENT106
Besides bringing dubious benefits to the United States and risks of
substantial environmental harm, there are questions about whether the Pres-
ident had the constitutional authority to issue the permit for the Keystone
XL Pipeline’s construction. This Part of the article discusses three com-
monly given constitutional rationales supporting the President’s issuance of
the Keystone XL Pipeline permit. They are, the power to issue the permit is:
(1) within the President’s prerogatives to expand delegated constitutional
power; (2) inherent in his authority under Article II of the Constitution to
take care that the laws are faithfully executed; and (3) inherent in his au-
thority over foreign affairs and the military. While each of these justifica-
tions is less than firm, Congress’ failure to object to the permit’s issuance
may have sanctioned it sub silentio, raising a non-constitutional rationale
for the permit’s legitimacy.
102. Slade, supra note 11, at 57. However, it should be noted that “TransCanada has agreed to R
reroute the pipeline to avoid the Sandhills region of Nebraska, under which lies the Ogallala Aquifer.”
Parker, supra note 13, at 236. R
103. Parker, supra note 13, at 236. On June 28, 2011, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety R
Administration issued a corrective action order to TransCanada for Keystone Pipeline System leaks. It
issued another one on April 9, 2016, another on November 16, 2017 for a leak of 210,000 gallons of oil,
and yet another corrective action order on Nov. 28, 2017 for Keystone Pipeline system leaks. McCoy et
al., supra note 63. R
104. Parker, supra note 13, at 235. R
105. Id. at 236 (providing “opponents also argue that the negative environmental impacts of the
pipeline construction alone simply outweigh any benefits”).
106. Earlier parts of the article address some of the non-legal rationales for issuing the Keystone XL
Pipeline permit, such as energy security leading to improved national security, stable oil prices,
economic and job growth, improved relations with Canada, and the rejoinders to those arguments, so
they are not addressed in this part of the article.
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A. Issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline Permit Is Within the
President’s Prerogative Power
“One school of constitutional theorists, accepting the view of preroga-
tive so brilliantly expounded by Alexander Hamilton in 1793, has main-
tained that the President is endowed by the Constitution with a high degree
of autonomy and discretion—with ‘the executive power of the United
States’ not with ‘the executive power herein granted.’”107 Both Madison
and Jefferson argued there is no executive prerogative because the presi-
dent, like Congress, “has only those powers enumerated in the Constitu-
tion.”108 Their view of inherent, or prerogative executive power, “was heav-
ily influenced by the authority belonging to a constitutional English mon-
arch—one whose prerogatives had been successively curtailed over the
centuries by the Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of Right (1628), and the
Bill of Rights (1689).”109 The argument against the need to include a prohi-
bition against the suspending power in the Bill of Rights—that the “wide-
spread understanding that the Constitution had not given the Chief Execu-
tive a suspending power of any kind, and that it was therefore unnecessary
‘to provide against the exercise of a power which did not exist’”110— af-
firmed that view.
President Lincoln was an early exponent of prerogative presidential
power. He “infused presidential war powers into the Commander in Chief
clause of Article II,” despite the fact the Constitution gives Congress, not
the president the power to wage war.111 According to John P. Roche, while
it was “doubtful whether the Framers intended anything more than civil
control over the military by this provision, Lincoln employed it as the ratio-
nale for broad substantive powers of presidential war-waging and, indeed,
based the Emancipation Proclamation upon his authority as Commander-in-
Chief.”112 In Ex parte Milligan,113 a unanimous Supreme Court rejected
Lincoln’s use of prerogative power to create military commissions for the
107. Roche, supra note 5, at 594; see also Id. at 598 (arguing “[t]he conception of domestic preroga- R
tive is found in the thought of Alexander Hamilton, and Abel Upshur could observe in 1840 that it had
been ‘gravely asserted in Congress that whatever power is neither legislative nor judiciary, is of course
executive, and, as such, belongs to the President under the Constitution”).
108. Id. at 594.
109. Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal
Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 881 (1994); see also Id. at 891 (stating “[t]he Framers did
not write on a clean slate, but on one which contained the indelible traces of four hundred years of
English constitutional history. In a case like this, as Holmes once wrote, ‘a page of history is worth a
volume of logic’”).
110. Id. at 889.
111. Roche, supra note 5, at 599. R
112. Id.
113. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
16
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trial of civilians when the non-military courts were open, holding his action
was beyond his constitutional and statutory authority.114
Although the concept of a presidential prerogative was “an important
strand in American constitutional law,” after Lincoln, the absence of do-
mestic emergencies led to it not being used much until President Franklin
Roosevelt.115 The few exceptions occurred in the late 19th Century in re-
sponse to industrial crises where presidents relied on both delegated and
inherent powers.116 For example, in In re Neagle,117 which authorized the
United States Attorney General’s appointment of United States Marshalls as
bodyguards for federal judges, Justice Miller contended that “there is a
‘peace of the United States’ and that the President is the keeper of the
peace.”118 He acknowledged his decision “blew new breath into the corpse
of the federal common law,” and that its political implications “were far-
reaching, for it could serve as the rationale for almost any presidential inter-
vention into domestic disorder.”119 In In re Debs120 the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the use of an injunction to stop the Pullman strike,
holding, “although there was no statutory authorization for his action,” the
President, acting through the United States Attorney, was “legitimately ex-
ercising prerogative power in seeking the injunction, and that the United
States Circuit Court was correct in granting it.”121
According to Clinton Rossiter, “‘[i]n the light of the Debs and Neagle
cases, it might easily be argued that there are no judicial limits to the Presi-
dent’s real or alleged ‘inherent’ power to protect the peace of the United
States.’”122 This view was expressed more fully by President Teddy
Roosevelt, explaining how his action during the coal strike
illustrated as well as anything that I did the theory which I have called the
Jackson-Lincoln theory of the Presidency; that is, that occasionally great
national crises arise which call for immediate and vigorous executive action,
and that in such cases it is the duty of the President to act upon the theory
that he is the steward of the people, and that the proper attitude for him to
take is that he is bound to assume that he has the legal right to do whatever
114. Roche, supra note 5, at 600 (stating Milligan had received the death penalty for disloyal activi- R
ties from a military commission established under “the sole authority of President Lincoln”). The major-
ity found that even Congress could not limit the rights of individuals. Id.
115. Id. at 602
116. Id.
117. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
118. Roche, supra note 5, at 603. R
119. Id.
120. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
121. Roche, supra note 5, at 603 (quoting Justice Brewer “The entire strength of the nation may be R
used to enforce in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all national powers and the security of
all rights entrusted by the Constitution to its care” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
122. Id. at 604.
17
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the needs of the people demand, unless the Constitution or the laws explic-
itly forbid him to do it.123
President Taft, on the other hand, believed presidents, no different
from Congress, had only the powers specifically set out in the Constitution.
He rejected Teddy Roosevelt’s concept of the president possessing common
law responsibilities of “Protector of the Peace of the United States” as well
as the holdings of the Debs and Neagle decisions.124 The most exuberant
modern user of prerogative power was President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, whose full-throated use of it reflected his “full acceptance of the
assignment of Protector of the Peace,” and, according to Roche, brought
“the United States to the edge of unconstitutional presidential dictator-
ship.”125 Between the start of war in Europe to enactment of the War Labor
Disputes Act, on June 25, 1943, FDR “seized eleven industrial facilities
ranging from one plant of the North American Aviation Company to the
whole soft-coal industry.”126 However, FDR relied on large delegations of
power from Congress and not inherent executive power, distinguishing
himself not only from Teddy Roosevelt, but also from Lincoln.127 Yet, FDR
cited general authority in the “Constitution and laws” as a basis for his
actions, and not specific statutes.128
John Roche concludes from his analysis of presidential use of preroga-
tive powers in the case of domestic emergencies that it “has been and will
continue to be shaped by the extent and intensity of the emergency. If a real
emergency exists, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will declare a
presidential action unconstitutional.”129 Indeed, “Supreme Court jurispru-
dence includes many examples where the Court has found an implied grant
of constitutional authority.”130 Roche discounts the possibility of an “un-
constitutional presidential dictatorship” because “Congress and the public
must agree with presidential emergency actions if they are to be effec-
tive.”131 The conclusion that “Congress and the President are the Siamese
twins of American ‘constitutional dictatorship,’” he says, is supported by
“the silences of American constitutional history.”132
123. Id.
124. Id. at 604–05.
125. Id. at 605.
126. Id. at 607.
127. Id. at 605.
128. Id. at 610 (providing that “Roosevelt’s assertion that he could overrule Congress on a statute is
an example of political poker-playing rather than a constitutional precedent”).
129. Id.
130. Alberto R. Gonzales, Presidential Powers, Immunities and Pardons, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 905,
910 (2019).
131. Roche, supra note 5, at 611. The one exception to this is President Harry S. Truman’s seizure of R
the steel mills. See Id.
132. Id.
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 81 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON102.txt unknown Seq: 19 31-MAR-20 9:31
2020 ISSUANCE OF THE KEYSTONE XL PERMIT 23
However, there is no single rule on whether a statute will displace a
presidential exercise of his prerogative power; rather, any determination on
that issue “is highly dependent on the facts and the provisions of the partic-
ular statute.”133 To the extent courts do not allow displacement of statutes,
it is because courts generally do not favor governments using prerogative
powers to subvert or ignore statutes.134 Additionally, courts consistently de-
cide against “conferral of coercive powers on government” when used
against individual liberty.135 President Trump’s permit for the Keystone XL
Pipeline preempted pending litigation brought by environmental and tribal
groups, an act of coercive power against individuals’ rights to seek redress
for injuries in court. The successful use of presidential prerogative powers
turns on the existence of an emergency, which is a fact specific determina-
tion. Here, the facts supporting an emergency are open to question. The
application of these principles to President Trump’s issuance of a permit for
the Keystone XL Pipeline make it unlikely that his was a justified use of his
prerogative powers, to the extent they exist at all.
B. Issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline Permit Is Within the
President’s Duty to Take Care that the Laws
Are Faithfully Executed
Supporters of the President’s issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline
permit contend that President Trump’s power to issue the permit falls
within his Article II, Section 3 power to “take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed.” The question is whether he can use that power in defiance
of Congress, as expressed in Section 501 of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut
Continuation Act of 2011.136 Section 501 specifically states the President
was to issue the permit through the Secretary of State under E.O. 13,377,
and leaves intact the executive orders prescribing the process for their issu-
ance, which he did not follow.137
The President’s Article II power is not an ever-expanding one that is
blind to the will of Congress. Viewed in a historical context, the Clause
becomes “a succinct and all-inclusive command through which the Framers
sought to prevent the Executive from resorting to the panoply of devices
employed by English kings to evade the will of Parliament.”138 In other
133. Benjamin B. Saunders, Democracy, Liberty and the Prerogative: The Displacement of Inherent
Executive Power by Statute, 41 FED. L. REV. 363, 364 (2013).
134. Id. at 363.
135. Id.
136. Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-78, § 501, 125 Stat.
1280, 1289 (2011).
137. Id. § 501, 125 Stat. at 1289.
138. May, supra note 109, at 873; see also Id. (arguing the Framers would have been familiar with R
“the four hundred year struggle of the English people to limit the king’s prerogative and achieve a
19
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words, the power to execute laws cannot be interpreted as the power to defy
them.
Indeed, presidents have complied with the will of Congress until re-
cently. From 1798 until 1981, while the president has questioned the valid-
ity of laws through veto messages and signing statements 135 times, in only
20 of those situations, did the president decide not to comply with the
law.139 The shortage of examples of presidential noncompliance “strongly
reinforces the argument that the Founders did not intend the President to
possess a power to suspend laws that he might think unconstitutional,”140 or
simply not like. It would be a “novel construction of the Constitution” to
read into the command that the president see that the laws are “faithfully
executed” a power to prevent their execution.141
Consistent with this view, the circumstances which might justify a
president not complying with congressional edicts are quite limited. For
example, non-compliance might be justified: (1) when the text of the Con-
stitution, the Framer’s intent, or Supreme Court precedent makes it clear
that the law in question is unconstitutional;142 (2) when the president has
been unable to redress his problem with the law through the legislative pro-
cess;143 (3) the only way to test the law’s constitutionality in court is
through its defiance;144 and (4) the president has exhausted all efforts to
ensure that judicial review actually happens.145 Beyond this limited situa-
tion, what might be seen as a “narrow privilege of noncompliance could
easily become a modern equivalent of the suspending power,”146 an execu-
tive power the British Bill of Rights ended and the United States has never
adopted.147
With respect to President Trump’s issuance of the Keystone XL Pipe-
line permit, there is no hint of unconstitutionality in the governing law or
the two executive orders. There has been no attempt by the President to
redress any problems he has with those legal requirements, prior to issuing
the permit, and, since the law and executive orders are constitutional on
their face, there is no need to test their constitutionality. If there were, it
government under law rather than royal fiat,” which ended in the Bill of Rights of 1689, making it
“illegal for the king to suspend or dispense with the laws or refuse their execution without Parliament’s
consent. The effect was to transfer the suspending power from the executive branch to the legislature”).
139. Id. at 977 (“The first of these incidents did not occur until 1860, three-quarters of a century
after the Constitution was framed”).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 899 (quoting Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 613 (1838)).
142. Id. at 988.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See discussion infra Part IV, and related notes.
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could have been done by challenging President Obama’s action under them,
which the Trump Administration did not do nor made any attempt to do.
Therefore, reliance on President Trump’s duty to see that the laws are faith-
fully executed as a basis for his issuance of the permit may provide imper-
fect cover for what otherwise might be viewed as an ultra vires exercise of
power.
C. Issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline Permit Is Within the
President’s Inherent Authority Over Foreign Affairs
and as Commander-in-Chief
Supporters of President Trump’s issuance of a permit for the Keystone
XL Pipeline also argue that the permit was within his Article II power as
Commander-in-Chief and inherent power over foreign affairs, and that their
exercise does not require congressional authorization.148 Indeed, the first
sentence of E.O. 11,423 states that “the ‘proper conduct of the foreign rela-
tions of the United States’ demands ‘executive permission’ for border
crossing facilities.”149 E.O. 11,423 also cites the power vested in the Presi-
dent “as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of the United States,” as authority for the President’s issu-
ance of permits for cross-border energy facilities.150 “Given the critical na-
ture of reliable fuel supplies to a well-functioning military and other na-
tional security concerns,” the executive order’s reliance on these authorities
makes sense.151
“The Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces, some measure of power (largely undefined by judicial inter-
pretation) that is immune from congressional restriction.”152 As an example
of this, “the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases approved President Lin-
coln’s seizure of merchant ships bound for Confederate ports even though
the seizure occurred before Congress had approved the blockade and recog-
nized the belligerency of the Confederacy.”153 Courts have been particu-
larly reluctant to limit a president’s emergency powers when the use of
148. See, e.g., Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint at
19–20, Indigenous Envtl. Network v. Trump, 2019 WL 3022289 (D. Mont. July 10, 2019); see also
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring) (stat-
ing presidents can “act in external affairs without congressional authority”).
149. Campau, supra note 24, at 281. R
150. Id. at 282.
151. Id.; Id. at 285 n.98 (E.O. 13,337 more generally references the authority vested in the president
“as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America”).
152. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt to Control Pres-
idential Emergency Power, Note, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1112–13 (1983) [hereinafter Presidential
Emergency Power].
153. Id. at 1113.
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those powers involves foreign relations, finding implied powers, or constru-
ing statutory text to sustain presidential initiatives.154
This reluctance to restrain presidents in emergency situations involv-
ing foreign matters leads to judicial deference when these circumstances
arise. Courts generally refuse to question any declaration of emergency by a
president given his attributed knowledge and foreign policy expertise, mak-
ing him the best judge of the situation.155 Another factor contributing to
judicial restraint is that any challenge of this nature would, in all likelihood,
present a political question, which courts prefer to avoid.156
To succeed as a constitutional basis for the President’s issuance of the
Keystone XL Pipeline permit, however, there must be a factual basis for the
exercise of the President’s Article II powers as commander-in-chief and
over foreign affairs. Thus, if President Trump could make a convincing case
that issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline is in the best interests of national
security, because assuring a reliable source of fuel supplies implicates the
country’s national security and involves foreign affairs, then any court re-
viewing his action might give him deference. The problem is, as Part II of
this article shows, neither interest was involved to any significant degree in
his issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit.157 Indeed, “President
Trump appears to be testing the American political system’s tolerance for
soft dictatorship through the cavalier—and potentially illegal—use of presi-
dential emergency powers.”158
An additional argument potentially supporting President Trump’s issu-
ance of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit is that Congress has sanctioned
his action.159 As a general matter, Congress has acted numerous times with
respect to the issuance of cross-border facilities, implicitly sanctioning the
presidential permitting process for such facilities.160 With respect to the
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1116.
156. Id.
157. See supra Part II, sub. C; Cf. Bruce Ackerman, No, Trump Cannot Declare an ‘Emergency’ to
Build His Wall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2019, https://perma.cc/D7WS-QZ9Q.
158. Stevenson, supra note 3. R
159. May, supra note 109, at 977–78 (stating “Felix Frankfurter once suggested that ‘a systematic, R
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before ques-
tioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President’”) (quoting Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
160. Campau, supra note 24, at 283 (“The very first ‘legislative foray into the permitting of the R
border crossing facilities’ gave congressional recognition to the legitimacy of the presidential permits
and demonstrated acquiescence to the process”); see also Id. at 285 n.99 (citing in support of the pro-
position that Congress’s failure to overhaul the permitting process and initial directive that the President
work within the permitting process indicated the legitimacy of his permitting actions, Natation Resource
Defense Council v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105, 109, 111 (D.D.C. 2009); Sierra Club v.
Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1162–63 (D. Minn. 2010); Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. Deparment of
State, 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1081–82 (D.S.D. 2009)).
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Keystone XL Pipeline, while Section 501 of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut
Continuation Act of 2011 “directed the president to grant a presidential per-
mit for the Keystone XL Pipeline unless he determined that it ‘would not
serve the national interest,’”161 it incorporated language from the applicable
executive orders setting out the process for approval of cross-border per-
mits, including the specific delegation of permitting authority to the State
Department. Thus, it is difficult to infer that Congress sanctioned President
Trump’s issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit, when that action
was in non-compliance with its clear intent that the process set out in the
executive orders be followed.162
Although there are credible arguments supporting the President’s issu-
ance of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit, none is without flaws. An argu-
ment based on presidential prerogative powers, an expansive view of the
Take Care Clause, or on the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief
and over foreign affairs is either not supported or conflicts with congres-
sional intent. So too, prior confirmation of the president’s power to issue
permits for cross-border energy facilities cannot be used to support a use of
that authority that is inconsistent with the specific will of Congress. None of
these problems, however, delivers a knockout punch to the argument in
question, and perhaps each may gain strength from the other if the argu-
ments are combined.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS OPPOSING PRESIDENT TRUMP’S
ISSUANCE OF THE KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE PERMIT163
Although opponents to President Trump’s issuance of a permit for the
Keystone XL Pipeline cite only two reasons supporting their position—is-
suance of the permit violates the separation of powers doctrine and exceeds
the President’s powers under Article II of the Constitution—compared to
the four rationales pipeline supporters have, they are not as easily refuted as
those raised by pipeline permit supporters. Still, neither of them is a “slam
dunk.”
161. Id. at 283.
162. See Id. at 283 (providing “In other words, Congress acknowledged the authority of EO 13,337
and passed a measure, signed into law, that gave deference to the permitting process. Relying on that
deference, the president used the authority that Congress recognized as legitimate and determined that
the pipeline was not in the national interest”).
163. In addition to the arguments set out here are points made earlier in the article about the permit’s
issuance, such allowing unassessed, unregulated significant environmental harms to occur because
environmental laws do not apply to the president, creates bad precedent as would be an outlier permit,
and provides support for other instances of presidential excesses, like reprogramming border wall
funding and various Immigration initiatives. These and the weaknesses in the non-constitutional
arguments are discussed in Part II of the article and are not repeated here.
23
Babcock: Issuance of the Keystone XL Permit
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2020
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON102.txt unknown Seq: 24 31-MAR-20 9:31
28 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 81
A. The President’s Issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline Permit
Violated the Separation of Powers Doctrine
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution gives Congress the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
states. Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 authorizes Congress to make all laws
which are necessary and proper for exercising its enumerated and all other
powers vested in the government of the United States or in any department
of the government, while Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 authorizes Con-
gress to regulate property belonging to the United States. Thus, to the extent
these powers are implicated in the issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline
permit, it is Congress, not the President, who can determine the terms for its
issuance. And Congress, when it directed President Trump to issue the per-
mit in the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011, incorpo-
rated the procedures for doing this set out in E.Os. 11,423 and 13,337.164
These procedures, among other things, delegated the permit-issuing func-
tion to the State Department. When President Trump, as opposed to the
Secretary of State, issued the permit and ignored the procedures governing
the permit’s issuance, requiring among other things compliance with ex-
isting laws, he “invaded the territory” of Congress, regardless of whether
Congress objected to the invasion.165
Congress’ decision not to delegate power to the president, and instead
delegate it to an agency, was deliberate.166 Indeed, the powers of the presi-
dent “are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or con-
junction with those of Congress.”167 However, “just because Congress men-
tioned an agency head’s regulatory authority does not mean that it necessa-
164. See Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-78, § 501, 125 Stat.
1280, 1289 (2011).
165. May, supra note 109, at 979 n.546 (“Writing for the Court in 1992, Justice O’Connor declared R
unequivocally that ‘[t]he Constitution’s division of power among the three Branches is violated where
one Branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon Branch approves the
encroachment’” (quoting New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2431 (1992))).
166. Thomas O. Sargentich, et al., The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An Essay
Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 18 (2007); see also Alan B. Morrison, The
Sounds of Silence: The Irrelevance of Congressional Inaction in Separation of Powers Litigation, 81
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1211, 1216 (2013) (noting “[w]hat is significant is that Justice Jackson and others
in the majority seemed to treat the failure to grant the President those powers as the functional
equivalent of denying them to him. In other words, inaction equaled action, and congressional silence
was the same as congressional legislation”).
167. Catherine Amirfar & Ashika Singh, The Trump Administration and the “Unmaking” of Inter-
national Agreements, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 451 (2018) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, at 635 (1952)); see also Presidential Emergency Power, supra note 152, at 1114 R
(The reality is that in a time of crisis, any limits on the president’s power to act are as likely to be
determined by his “political relationship with Congress, his popular support, and the relative strengths of
will of the occupants of the three branches of government” than by any “statutory arrangement”).
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rily precluded presidential directives to the agency.”168 Indeed, Justice
Kagan “suggests that the President has so much power over executive agen-
cies that it is most realistic to envision Congress as allowing presidential
directives,”169 citing as examples of that power, the unrestricted power to
nominate officers of the United States, the power to remove them at will,
and the power to subject them “to potentially far-ranging procedural over-
sight.”170
If one agrees with Justice Kagan on this point, then it is “realistic to
suppose that Congress also allows the President to have a fourth power—
namely, directive authority to control regulatory decisions.”171 Justice Ka-
gan goes so far as to argue that a president can displace congressionally
delegated regulatory authority “based on legislative intent as well as institu-
tional competence, with the latter constituting a policy-based defense of
presidential directives to agencies as uniquely accountable and effec-
tive.”172 Arguably, Justice Kagan’s view of presidential power gives a pres-
ident the power to act in the agency’s stead, as President Trump did when
he exercised the State Department’s authority to issue the Keystone XL
Pipeline permit. “Moreover, the ‘very subtlety’ of the line between influ-
ence through appointment, removal, and procedural oversight and command
over the substance of regulatory action ‘provides reason to doubt any con-
gressional intent to disaggregate them, in the absence of specific evidence
of that desire.’”173
But perhaps it makes more “sense to say as a general matter that when
a statute confers statutory authority on an agency head, the use of the au-
thority should not be utterly displaced by the President.”174 Although “the
President can supervise and guide agency policymaking, the President can-
not go so far as to displace the agency head’s discretion to make decisions
vested in that officer by law.”175 In other words, the president has no au-
thority to make a decision when Congress has delegated this authority to an
168. Sargentich et al., supra note 166, at 18; see also Morrison, supra note 166, at 1217–18 (“In R
addition to its general acquiescence argument, Justice Rehnquist’s opinion also invoked what might be
called ‘specific acquiescence’ because ‘Congress has consistently failed to object to this longstanding
practice of claim settlement by executive agreement, even when it has had an opportunity to do so.’ As
seen by the Court, Congress had considered related legislation and failed to include anything that would
limit the power to use the Settlement Commission”).
169. Sargentich et al., supra note 166, at 19. R
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 35.
173. Id. at 19–20 (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 21.
175. Id. at 7.
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agency head,176 as President Trump did when he issued the permit for the
Keystone XL Pipeline, where Congress had not displaced the authority to
make that decision from the State Department.
A president stepping in and making a decision that Congress has dele-
gated to an agency is different from a president telling an agency what he
wants it to do. The latter is more an “expression of presidential priorities,”
not a “displacement” of an agency head’s discretion.177 “When Congress
gives specific regulatory authority to an agency it creates, it confirms that
this is the entity responsible for the functions under discussion.”178 It would
be paradoxical for Congress to create an agency to address a particular
problem, then “overcome the agency’s role by giving the President power
to decide what the agency will do.”179
By issuing the Keystone XL Pipeline permit in defiance of Congress’
will, President Trump took an action when his power was at its “lowest
ebb.”180 While “Congressional opposition likely needs to be reflected in
duly enacted laws or other constitutionally sufficient congressional action”
176. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
25 (1995) (noting that the generally accepted view is that “the President has no authority to make the
decision himself, at least if Congress has conferred the relevant authority on an agency head”) (cited in
Kagan, supra note 10, at 2250 n.8); see also Sargentich et al., supra note 166, at 7 (stating “the President R
can take the not entirely cost-free step of firing a recalcitrant agency head, assuming he or she is dealing
with an at-will executive officer. Again, what the President cannot do is merely assume that his or her
own will is necessarily controlling when the statute vests regulatory authority in an agency head”).
177. Sargentich et al., supra note 166, at 7–8; see also Id. at 9, n.22 (“‘In the text both of the R
Constitution and of Congress’s statutes, it is the heads of departments who have legal duties vis-a`-vis
regulatory law. The President can ask about those duties and see that they are faithfully performed, but
he and his department heads are to understand that the duties themselves are theirs. . . .’”) (quoting Peter
L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 984 (1997)).
178. Id. at 10; but see Kagan, supra note 10, at 2251 (arguing “that a statutory delegation to an R
executive agency official—although not to an independent agency head—usually should be read as
allowing the President to assert directive authority, as Clinton did, over the exercise of the delegated
discretion. This rule of statutory construction is based in part (though only in part) on policy considera-
tions relating to the desirability of presidential control over administration”).
179. Sargentich et al., supra note 166, at 10. R
180. Amirfar & Singh, supra note 167, at 445 n.12 (quoting Justice Jackson’s three categories of R
presidential power and saying, “The Youngstown categories are: (1) [w]hen the President acts pursuant
to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all
that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate;’ (2) ‘[w]hen the President acts in
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain;’ and (3) ‘[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at his lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.’”); see also
Morrison, supra note 166, at 1214 (“In the key portion [Youngstown], Jackson set up a tri-partite method R
of analysis in which he asserted that the powers of the President are at their apex when they are ex-
pressly or impliedly granted in the Constitution or in legislation, and at their nadir when they are ex-
pressly granted to another branch in the Constitution or expressly or impliedly limited by legislation. He
then created a third or middle category in which there is no authoritative law, and in which the Presi-
dent’s authority is uncertain”).
26
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to fit within the Youngstown third category,181 the circumstances surround-
ing the Keystone XL Pipeline presidential permit did not involve “congres-
sional inertia, indifference or quiescence,” which could arguably “enable, if
not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”182 Argua-
bly, the President’s action came at the direction of Congress.183 Even “‘a
state of war is not a blank check for the President’”; whatever power the
“Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other na-
tions or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at
stake.”184
By violating the doctrine, President Trump has reduced the ability of
the other two branches to act as a check on his actions.185 Senator Charles
E. Schumer’s complaint that President George W. Bush undermined Con-
gress’ legislative prerogative in a fundamental way by “repeatedly insisting
on unilateral action with respect to the war on terror rather than cooperating
with Congress to modify laws that might be in need of changes or up-
dates,”186 resonates with the current Administration’s unilateral actions.187
President Reagan was another president whose executive orders generated
complaints that they violated the separation of powers doctrine because
they ignored the fact that the Constitution gave Congress the power to make
laws and then delegated that power to agencies, not presidents.188 “‘In the
181. Amirfar & Singh, supra note 167, at 446. R
182. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
183. See Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-78, § 501, 125 Stat.
1280, 1289 (2011).
184. Charles E. Schumer, Under Attack: Congressional Power in the Twenty-First Century, 1 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 3, 12 (2007) (quoting Justice O’Connor in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536
(2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Id. at 6 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 263 (James Madison) and saying “[a]s Madison
wrote in The Federalist No. 51, the Republic would function well only within such a competitive and
oppositional system: ‘[I]n all the subordinate distributions of power, . . . the constant aim is to divide and
arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other’”); see also Id. at
24 (“Lindsey Graham once suggested that, ‘When a President gets out of bounds and doesn’t do as he or
she should do constitutionally . . . it is up to us to put them [sic] back in bounds’”).
186. Id. at 8.
187. An example of such an action was President Trump’s declaration of a national emergency under
the National Emergencies Act of 1976, on February 15, 2019, to support his unilateral decision to build
a border wall between Mexico and the United States. Except no president had ever used this power to
finance a project Congress explicitly refused to appropriate money for. In the words of Representative
Jerrold Nadler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, the President’s action was a “gross abuse
of power that subverts key principles laid out in the Constitution.” While House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
called this action a “power grab” and an “‘end run’ around Congress’s constitutional authority over
federal spending.” Stevenson, supra note 3, at 2. R
188. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2279–80; see also Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehn- R
quist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J.
363, 387 (2003) (stating “[o]n issues of nonjudicial interpretation, President Reagan should be placed in
history with the handful of past Presidents most renowned for promoting constitutional views indepen-
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framework of our Constitution,’ Justice Black famously wrote, ‘the Presi-
dent’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that
he is to be a lawmaker.’”189
Furthermore, President Trump’s actions, by usurping the authority of
the State Department to issue presidential permits in this situation, effec-
tively suspended Section 501 of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continua-
tion Act of 2011, which incorporated E.Os. 11,434, and 13,377 delegating
the issuance of a permit to the State Department and setting out rules gov-
erning the processing of these permits. While the Constitution does not con-
tain an explicit rejection of a presidential suspending power, “there is con-
vincing evidence in the text of the Constitution and in the debates surround-
ing its adoption that most of the Founders endorsed the English Bill of
Rights’ principle that a statute may be suspended only by the lawmaking
authority, and not by the Executive acting alone.”190 Given the Framers’
almost “unbending opposition to an absolute veto and their concern that
even a qualified veto might ‘put too much in the power of the President,’ it
is virtually inconceivable that they intended the ‘executive power’ con-
ferred by Article II to encompass a prerogative of suspending the laws.”191
Therefore, no president has either the direct or implied power to negate an
act of Congress192 or to usurp the delegated powers of an agency, as Presi-
dent Trump did with his issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit.
B. President Trump’s Issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline Permit
Exceeded His Authority under Article II of the Constitution
As a general matter, “absolute sovereignty in the United States resides
in the people, and not the government,” meaning the president only has
dent from, and in conflict with, those of the courts: Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lin-
coln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt”).
189. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2320 (quoting Justice Black in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. R
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)); but see Id. at 2290 (saying this view had substantially changed by
the Clinton Administration where his executive orders “implied precisely this power—presidential di-
rective authority over discretionary decisions assigned by Congress to specified executive branch offi-
cials” without having to remove any agency head as the president’s order would displace any contrary
agency order); see also Id. (“For the Clinton executive order to make this claim was to say something
significant about the nature of the relationship between the agencies and the President—to say that they
were his and so too were their decisions”).
190. May, supra note 109, at 873. R
191. Id. at 881; see also Id. at 1010 (stating “The President’s duty to insure that the laws are ‘faith-
fully executed,’ the assumption in Article I, §9 that the suspending power belongs to Congress, the
Convention’s decision to give the President a qualified rather than an absolute veto, the Framers’ con-
cept of the ‘executive power,’ and the fact that not even the Antifederalists insisted upon including a ban
against the suspending power in the Bill of Rights, all support the conclusion that the Constitution did
not give the Executive a power to suspend the laws”).
192. Id. at 892 (stating [t]he authority to void acts of Congress on the ground that they violate the
Constitution was not delegated to the executive branch”).
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limited powers—those “granted through the Constitution.”193 A president’s
power can go no further than the power of the people of the United States—
the true sovereign—have surrendered to the government.194 This distin-
guishes the president from “a single, king-like sovereign that retains unfet-
tered power and thus the inherent authority to act without limitations.”195
The Court’s handling of cases involving presidential immunity, affirms
the limited nature of presidential power. Thus, any “safe harbor of presiden-
tial immunity protection” is limited to those circumstances where the presi-
dent’s conduct “is supported by an express or implied grant of authority in
the Constitution or by statute, based on legal advice by government law-
yers, or grounded on court precedent.”196
In a case involving putative defamatory statements by the President,
the Court, in Spaulding v. Vilas,197 “held that ‘public policy and conve-
nience’ compelled recognition of immunity for suits arising from official
acts” because not recognizing immunity for official acts would cause the
presidents to be “apprehensive in exercising their discretion for fear of civil
liability, particularly when [the] time called for bold action.”198 The Spauld-
ing Court based its decision on the structure of the Constitution, separation
of powers, and “the nature of the President’s office,” making the President
“uniquely situated such that absolute immunity is required.”199 While the
Court in Spaulding recognized that “absolute immunity traditionally only
extended to acts in furtherance of an official’s duties,” it nonetheless ex-
tended that immunity to acts “within the ‘outer perimeter’ of his official
duties.”200 Although this was “both an intentional and comparatively expan-
sive grant of immunity,” it did not extend to actions “outside of the ‘outer
perimeter’ of his official responsibilities.”201 Thus, Spaulding acknowl-
edges that not everything a president does is legitimate, and while a presi-
dent can take action at the outer limits of his “official duties,” he cannot go
beyond those limits and expect to enjoy the protections of his office.
193. Douglas B. McKechnie, @POTUS: Rethinking Presidential Immunity in the Time of Twitter, 72
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 26 (2017) (discussing presidential immunity from libelous speech flowing from his
Article II powers).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Gonzales, supra note 130, at 913; see also McKechnie, supra note 193, at 4 (noting “[w]hile R
textually absent from the Constitution, the Supreme Court has determined that a President retains abso-
lute immunity when he ‘acts within the “outer perimeter” of his official’ duties”).
197. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
198. McKechnie, supra note 193, at 13 (providing “[i]n other words, when acting in his capacity as a R
chief executive, and within the limits of his authority, the head of a governmental agency should not be
in fear that the motivation behind his actions will be the subject of a lawsuit”).
199. Id. at 14.
200. Id. at 14–15.
201. Id. at 15.
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The Supreme Court has applied this thinking, again in the context of
defamatory speech, to speech in the context of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, finding “where the government is inspired by animus—mal-
ice’s equivalent—its activities fall outside the boundaries of constitutionally
permissible government action.”202 “In particular, the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment limits malevolent govern-
ment aims. The Amendment demarcates a border between constitutional,
permissible government power and extra-constitutional, impermissible gov-
ernment power.”203
The fact that it is the president who engages in unprotected conduct is
significant, because, as head of state and “in control of the executive power
of the United States government,” his words reflect the “government’s in-
tentions, interests, and goals.”204 Thus, when a president maliciously de-
fames, it’s not simply an individual’s defamatory statement; his words gain
“the imprimatur of state action.”205 When he does this, the president “tran-
scends the ‘outer perimeter’ of his constitutional duties and finds himself
beyond the legitimate functions of his office—he is in a no man’s land.”206
Based on the reasoning in these cases, one might argue, if it can be estab-
lished President Trump travelled beyond the outer boundaries of his official
duties when he issued a permit for the construction and operation of the
Keystone XL Pipeline, his action is entitled to no special protection by vir-
tue of his office as the acts themselves are not presidential acts.
Therefore, there are cognizable arguments that President Trump’s
usurpation of the State Department’s mandatory duty to issue cross-border
permits for energy facilities violated the separation of powers doctrine and
exceeded his authority under Article II of the Constitution, as they were
beyond the perimeters of his authorized power. However, both arguments
rest on inferences—that Congress incorporated the governing executive or-
ders of prior presidents in its 2011 statute setting out procedures for the
issuance of a permit for the facilities in question, and that Supreme Court
opinions on the president’s immunity for defamatory statements are appli-
cable to his actions. In another context entirely, a court might find these
arguments are “a slender reed”207 on which to rest arguments constricting a
president’s exercise of his powers as Commander-in-Chief and over foreign
affairs.
202. Of potential relevance to those who oppose President Trump’s actions with regard to the detain-
ing of migrants and the construction on the border wall. See McKechnie, supra note 193, at 4 (citing R
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982)).
203. Id. at 23.
204. Id. at 25.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 25–26.
207. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (Chief Justice Holmes writing for the majority).
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V. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AND OPPOSING A DOMINANT PRESIDENT
The American public harbors high and rising expectations about what a
President should be able to accomplish. The unity and “personality” of the
presidential office long has made it the dominant focus of public attention
devoted to the political world. As the role and scope of government have
grown, as Congress repeatedly has failed to demonstrate sustained capacity
for political leadership, and as modern media technologies have placed the
President ever more in the spotlight, the public increasingly has looked to
him for all manner of policy direction.208
The preceding analysis of the non-constitutional and constitutional rea-
sons supporting and opposing President Trump’s issuance of a permit for
construction and operation of the Keystone XL Pipeline is not a clear win
for either side. While the non-constitutional arguments tilt the scale slightly
toward those against issuance of the permit, the basis for many of them is
speculative—for example, operation of the Pipeline may cause environmen-
tal damage and may not depress oil prices—and the constitutional argu-
ments supporting issuance while more numerous than those opposing it, are
based more on inference than those in opposition. To help determine
whether President Trump’s issuance of the permit for the Keystone XL
Pipeline was problematic, this Part of the article evaluates whether his ac-
tion represents a troubling unchecked expansion of presidential power,
which could permanently unbalance the structure of government. If it could,
should we be concerned?
Justice Kagan might say no to the last question. She says we live in a
time of “presidential administration,”209 in which administrative power has
been consolidated in the president.210 She identifies the “presidentialization
of administration—the emergence of enhanced methods of presidential con-
trol over the regulatory state”—as the “most important development in the
last two decades in administrative process” with important implications for
“administrative substance.”211 President Obama’s climate change initiative,
208. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2310; see also Id. at 2332 (arguing “[t]he Presidency’s unitary power R
structure, its visibility, and its ‘personality’ all render the office peculiarly apt to exercise power in ways
that the public can identify and evaluate”).
209. Id. at 2246 (stating “[t]he history of the American administrative state is the history of competi-
tion among different entities for control of its policies . . . . at different times, one or another has come to
the fore and asserted at least a comparative primacy in setting the direction and influencing the outcome
of administrative process. In this time, that institution is the Presidency. We live today in an era of
presidential administration”).
210. Yumehiko Hoshijima, Presidential Administration and the Durability of Climate-Conscious-
ness, 127 YALE L.J. 170, 177–78 (2017) (stating “presidential administration refers to a recent trend
toward consolidation of administrative power in the presidency, especially through regulatory review at
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). By this account, Presidents have increasingly taken
public ownership of—and exerted ‘directive authority’ over—administrative actions instead of leaving
agencies to their own devices”).
211. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2383. R
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which was obscured from congressional attention until it intersected with
Congress’ power over the budget,212 was an example of “presidentaliza-
tion.” Another example may be President Trump’s reprogramming appro-
priated moneys to build an unauthorized border wall or, the instant exam-
ple, his usurpation of the State Department’s delegated authority to issue
permits for cross-border energy facilities. The concern is that “executive
power may be an inferior substitute for a well-functioning legislature that
passes well-considered laws that reflect the democratic interest and fosters
the vigorous democratic process” to address difficult problems.213
One argument in favor of a dominant president is that they are elected,
federal officials and judges are not, and are elected nationally, while Sena-
tors are elected only on a statewide basis and Representatives are from dis-
tricts.214 This gives the president “a nationwide constituency, to which he or
she is uniquely accountable.”215 This may also immunize the president from
capture by private sector special interests more than Senators and Congress-
men “who live in a hothouse of pork barrel spending for constituents.”216
But, the teachings of public choice theory show that all public institutions,
including the president, “tend to serve organized interests at the expense of
the general public.”217 Despite having been elected by a national electorate,
there is no reason to assume that a given president is “accountable to some
diffuse, majoritarian interest of the public in general.”218
Another argument in favor of dominant presidents is that they can take
action faster and more effectively than Congress because of Congress’ size
and need to act collectively.219 Compared to agencies, a president’s per-
spective is broader as they are responsible for the entire executive branch
and can act unilaterally,220 and the scope of an agency’s responsibilities is
much more limited, given agencies have “less comprehensive, more paro-
212. Hoshijima, supra note 210, at 231 (arguing “the Obama Administration avoided such budgetary R
control as much as possible by hiding climate change spending throughout the federal budget”); see also
Id. at 244 (providing “even though public opinion during the Obama Presidency overwhelmingly fa-
vored treating climate change as a serious public problem, there is something unsettling about the
Obama Administration’s practice—however well-intended—of deliberately hiding money throughout
the federal budget to evade congressional scrutiny”).
213. Id. at 244; see also Id. at 2331 (noting “[t]he presidential model must face the same challenge:
how does it fare, on its own terms and in comparison with alternative approaches, in promoting the
accountability and effectiveness of administrative government?”).
214. Sargentich et al., supra note 166, at 4. R
215. Id.
216. Id. Sargentich also makes the point that administrators also “become dependent on powerful
voices in the private sector for political support and information.” Id.
217. Id. at 27.
218. Id. at 28.
219. Id. at 4.
220. Id.
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chial perspectives.”221 The same might be said of Congress whose perspec-
tive and interests are scattered among various committees and whose ability
to act unilaterally depends on the strength of the congressional leadership in
both houses.
“Greater accountability to the public, less domination by special inter-
ests, greater effectiveness and comprehensiveness in orientation, less paro-
chialism—these are the institutional virtues claimed by the presidency’s
strongest supporters as its comparative advantages over other governmental
institutions,”222 including Congress. However, those who worry about pre-
sidentialism fear erosion of the checks and balances that prevent one branch
from dominating the others to the detriment of the national interest. These
thoughts and others are developed in more detail below as the two sides of
the debate are brought into closer focus, using President Trump’s issuance
of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit as the triggering event for the discus-
sion.
A. In Support of a Dominant President
There are several reasons why dominant presidents make sense, partic-
ularly in the current political environment. A dominant president can offer
greater efficiency than either of the other two branches223 as well as a way
to overcome congressional deadlock and institutional barriers facing presi-
dential initiatives. The president, elected in national elections, represents
the national interest more than Congress. The courts, Congress, and the
public can check presidential abuses of power, and there are lots of positive
examples of dominant presidents in our past.
With respect to efficiency, the president is singular, takes no recesses,
and has access to confidential sources of information, making the president
“the best equipped of the three branches to act with the necessary decisive-
ness, dispatch, and knowledge.”224 Because the president has supervisory
authority over the entire executive branch “he can synchronize and apply
general principles to agency action in a way that congressional committees,
special interest groups, and bureaucratic experts cannot.”225 “Alone among
the actors competing for control over the federal bureaucracy, the President
221. Id.
222. Id.; see also Johnsen, supra note 188, at 368 (stating “Reagan was among the handful of presi- R
dents most critical of judicial exclusivity in constitutional interpretation and most supportive of presi-
dential interpretative independence (even as he sought to diminish Congress’s interpretive role)”).
223. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2331 (providing “[a]ll models of administration must address two core R
issues: how to make administration accountable to the public and how to make administration efficient
or otherwise effective”).
224. Presidential Emergency Power, supra note 152, at 1103. R
225. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2339. R
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has the ability to effect comprehensive, coherent change in administrative
policymaking.”226
Champions of a strong presidency, like Justice Kagan, praise the of-
fice’s efficiency, its administrative effectiveness and ability to achieve pres-
idential goals “without undue cost, in an expeditious and coherent man-
ner.”227 Because the president is “a unitary actor, he can act without the
indecision and inefficiency that so often characterize the behavior of collec-
tive entities,”228 like Congress. Congress mostly “acts in decentralized and
reactive ways unlikely to promote coordination, increase efficiency, or pro-
vide leadership.”229 Congress “cannot adequately prescribe in advance the
measures to be taken in response to particular emergencies; the unforeseen
dangers that are endemic to crises require the availability of great discre-
tionary power.”230 Thus, Justice Kagan argues that increasing the presi-
dent’s power in relation to Congress could lead to “less factionally driven
and more coherent and active political oversight.”231
But there are those who do not agree with Justice Kagan’s support for
presidentialism. Thomas Sargentich believes Justice Kagan’s “presidential
model has become a full-blown presidential mystique, in which the special
character of chief executive oversight is underscored.”232 He argues “the
policy arguments for the presidential mystique exaggerate the presidency’s
positive qualities, while unduly diminishing the attributes of Congress and
agencies. Indeed, her accountability and effectiveness claims present a pic-
ture of the President as a white knight uniquely able to vindicate the public
interest.”233 However, there needs to be accountability even for the actions
of a white knight. “The essence of accountability lies in the transparency of
government actions, the public’s capacity to insist on justifications for the
exercise of power, and arrangements that subject officials to discipline
when justifications for their actions fall short.”234
Another problem with arguments promoting enhancement of presiden-
tial power are that they are “one-sided and unbalanced,” tending to over-
emphasize the president’s broad accountability and understating the repre-
sentativeness of Congress as well as overstating “the policymaking effec-
226. Id. at 2341.
227. Id. at 2339.
228. Id. at 2339.
229. Id. at 2348–49 (“When Congress acts in this sphere, it does so through committees and sub-
committees highly unrepresentative of the larger institution (let alone the nation) and significantly asso-
ciated with particularized interests”).
230. Presidential Emergency Power, supra note 152, at 1103. R
231. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2349. R
232. Sargentich et al., supra note 166, at 4. R
233. Id. at 35–36.
234. Peter M. Shane, Legislative Delegation, the Unitary Executive, and the Legitimacy of the Ad-
ministrative State, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 108 (2010).
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tiveness of the President.”235 Even a president who adheres to legal con-
straints on his actions “can energetically impose on the bureaucracy a
wrong-headed policy.”236
Peter Shane opposes “the philosophy of presidentialism,” which he de-
scribes as the president having “a wide range of powers virtually exempt
from congressional regulation or judicial review, including the power of
command over all discretionary policymaking of other executive of-
ficers.”237 He argues this operationalization of the theory of the unitary ex-
ecutive “threatens to create an organizational culture of entitlement in the
executive branch that is antagonistic to democracy and the rule of law,”
which may lead to lawless decision-making.238 He argues that a “true uni-
tary executive” makes the legitimacy of the state vulnerable, not because of
any broad policymaking delegation by Congress, “but because of efforts by
Presidents and misguided Justices to insulate the executive from the checks
and balances that the Constitution intends and on which good governance
rests.”239 Even Justice Kagan, a supporter of strong presidential power, ac-
knowledges that the “comparatively unitary, responsive, and energetic insti-
tution of the Presidency” may be more likely “to deviate from accepted
interpretations of delegation provisions.”240
On the positive side of a dominant president is that, unlike Congress,
the president represents a national constituency. This gives the president an
“an electoral incentive to represent the nation’s public as a whole.”241 It
also gives the president “a stronger relation to the public’s majoritarian
preferences than anyone else, including members of Congress, agency
heads, or leaders of interest groups.”242 The national scope of the election
means that presidential campaigns focus on broad policy issues.243 But, Jus-
tice Kagan warns that even a candidate gaining a popular majority, which
235. Sargentich et al., supra note 166, at 27; see also Id. at 27 (saying the arguments also “overstate R
the policymaking effectiveness of the President while diminishing that of agencies”).
236. Id. at 34.
237. Shane, supra note 234, at 109. R
238. Id.; see also Kagan, supra note 10, at 2349 (“the President has no greater warrant than an R
agency official to exceed the limits of statutory authority. But the history of presidential administration
may suggest that it poses a danger of such lawlessness—that Presidents, more than agency officials
acting independently, tend to push the envelope when interpreting statutes”).
239. Shane, supra note 234, at 110. R
240. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2350. R
241. Sargentich et al., supra note 166, at 25; see also Kagan, supra note 10, at 2335 (arguing “[t]he R
advent of what has become known as the permanent presidential campaign, a development linked to
fundamental changes in polling technology and mass media, at once demonstrates and reinforces the
President’s attention to the national electorate’s views and interests”).
242. Sargentich et al., supra note 166, at 26. R
243. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2334. Although Justice Kagan’s comment is limited to the breadth of R
the policy issues providing the public with some information about the future president’s view of regula-
tion, the comment supports broader implications, as I have noted in the text.
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has eluded some recent presidents like George W. Bush and Donald J.
Trump, “rarely provide[s] conclusive grounds to infer similar support for
even that candidate’s most important positions . . . .”244 This gives “Presi-
dential claims of prior public validation” for their action “a tinny tim-
bre.”245
Given that a president can be elected without obtaining the majority of
the popular vote, it is difficult for supporters of the concept of a dominant
president to maintain that an election creates “a clear majoritarian mandate
on a particular matter of policy.”246 Presidential campaigns are influenced
by the electorate’s view of broad issues, such as the country’s national se-
curity needs or economic conditions, or more likely, a candidate’s personal
appeal as opposed to particular policy issues, and often symbolic and emo-
tional issues (like fear of migrants) can dominate a campaign.247 These fac-
tors also make it difficult to “suggest that such contests generate sharply-
drawn majoritarian mandates as to particular policy issues.”248 Addition-
ally, presidents generally rely on the financial support of individual interest
groups and are attentive to that electoral base, whose interests are
remembered after the election.249 This makes it “implausible to view the
electorate as an undifferentiated body of nation-wide voters, each of whom
carries equal weight with a President.”250 The idea of a “‘national’ presi-
dential election is oversimplified. In reality, presidential elections consist of
a series of state contests, the rewards of which are the state’s electoral col-
lege votes.”251
In fact, it is Congress, with its “broad-based representation of constitu-
encies across the nation,” that appears to speak for the interests of a broader
range of public opinions than any single executive officer, including the
President of the United States.252 “If broad representation is the goal, con-
gressional action is an important means of achieving it.”253 The accounta-
bility defense of a dominant president thus “embraces an oversimplified,
one-sided slant in favor of presidential hegemony.”254 Moreover, Congress
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Sargentich et al., supra note 166, at 28; see also Id. (stating “[f]or one thing, a President can be R
elected without obtaining a majority of the popular vote—as in the cases of President Clinton in 1992
and 1996 and President George W. Bush in 2000”).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 29.
250. Id.; see also Id. at 33 (stating that “[i]t is not unheard of for presidents themselves to be paro-
chial in their commitments”).
251. Id. at 29.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 30.
254. Id.
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offers a check on the actions of the president who just might use his power
“to inappropriately cloud issues and avoid accountability.”255 Having Con-
gress function as a check on the president comforts anyone who oppose
their policies.256 And, the “vigorous debate fostered by a robust system of
institutional interaction can help to prevent the dominance of particular spe-
cial interests.”257
Privileging the president’s opinions over those voices of the other two
branches insufficiently recognizes the importance of “dialogue involving
the people and all of the institutions of government in pursuit of the public
interest.”258 Justice Kagan’s vision of “presidentialism” exalts the presi-
dent’s positions as “singularly rational, comprehensive, and valuable” and
disregards “the possibility of presidential narrow-mindedness, fixation on
particular goals to the detriment of broader objectives, or indebtedness to
specific interests rather than a more idealized national perspective.”259
Supporters of a dominant president, like Justice Kagan, also argue that
Congress, the courts, and public interest groups can check any potential
abuses by the president. She opines that “[i]f Congress can create a zone of
independent administration by preventing the President from removing offi-
cials at will, then it can advance the same end by barring the President from
imposing his policy choices on them.”260 In theory, these checks on the
president sound very good, but the ability of each to perform that function
depends on their institutional strength and presidential transparency, neither
of which is assured.261 For example, in the case of the Keystone XL Pipe-
line permit, courts cannot review the merits of the President’s action, and
255. Id. at 30, n.127 (citing Robert R. M. Verchick, Toward Normative Rules for Agency Interpreta-
tion: Defining Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 845, 858 (2004) and concluding
that “Elena Kagan acknowledges the possibility that a President might use his or her power to inappro-
priately cloud issues and avoid accountability, but she grossly underestimates the danger”).
256. Id. at 32.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 33.
260. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2323. R
261. “For years, President Bush has repeated a simple point when challenged about the aggressive-
ness of his Administration’s policies: ‘I came to Washington to solve problems.” Like the President,
every member of Congress came to Washington to solve problems, and to make America stronger and
safer. However, the power of Congress to satisfy its constitutional responsibilities and provide for the
general welfare of the American people has diminished in recent years. The strength and influence of
Congress is not a partisan issue, and its power should not ebb and flow depending on which party
controls which levers of government. The American people deserve active and aggressive lawmakers-
not despite the troubled times we live in, but because of the troubled times we live in.” Schumer, supra
note 184, at 39. R
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the speed with which President Trump issued the permit cloaked his action
from public and congressional view.262
There is also “no certainty” that the Supreme Court will determine
whether the President can ignore a law based on his opinion of its constitu-
tionality, in this case Section 501 of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Contin-
uation Act of 2011, should he do so.263 Between 1789 and 1981, the Court
only reviewed two of twenty instances of constitutionally based presidential
defiance of a congressional act.264 The Court addressed the issue of the
President’s refusal to comply with the law in neither of those instances;
rather, it went to the merits of the statute’s validity.265 The result is unless
“Congress takes steps to check presidential refusals to honor ‘unconstitu-
tional’ laws, we may find that through a subtle process of accretion, the
Executive has acquired a suspending power that is both selective and abso-
lute.”266 And it is naive to suppose that members of Congress have large or
enduring commitments to the public interest, given their desire to retain
their seats, and their constituents either want to “appropriate the benefits of
governmental largesse or to avoid the burdens of governmental regula-
tion.”267 Members are generally happy to satisfy their constituents by trad-
ing public policies for support for reelection.268
Thus, there is a risk that, “granting plenary executive power to act in
emergencies may pose great dangers to the rule of law and to our system of
limited, constitutional government.”269 After-the-fact congressional review
of a presidential action, may not be able to reverse that action and is “con-
strained by constitutional doctrine prohibiting legislative interference in the
execution of the laws.”270 “The partisan and constituency interests of indi-
vidual members of Congress usually prevent them from acting collectively
262. Parker, supra note 13, at 255. (stating that “[t]here is no dispute that when the President, not R
DOS, makes the decision to issue a permit, that decision is not reviewable. But, unless the President
actually invokes that authority, DOS’s decision should be reviewable”).
263. The government’s defense of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit is broadly based on the Presi-
dent’s assessment of his constitutional powers. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, Indigenous Envtl. Network. v. Trump, (D. Mont. June 27, 2019) (No.
4:19-cv-00028-BMM).
264. May, supra note 109, at 999. R
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1011. May notes there are things Congress might do, such giving the president “improved
means of obtaining judicial review as an alternative to defiance, discouraging lower level executive
officials from carrying out directives to ignore the law, and increasing access to the courts for those who
wish to challenge noncompliance when and if it occurs.” Id.
267. Sargentich, et al., supra note 166, at 25. R
268. Id.
269. Presidential Emergency Power, supra note 152, at 1103. See also Kagan, supra note 10, at R
2313 (noting “[o]r as a less restrained advisor [Paul Begala] remarked, in comparing executive direc-
tives to legislative initiatives: ‘Stroke of the pen, law of the land. Kind of cool’”).
270. Presidential Emergency Power, supra note 152, at 1103. R
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to preserve congressional power—or, what is almost the same thing, to
deny authority to the other branches of government.”271
But the bureaucracy itself and the public can constrain a president. For
example, “[i]nertia, bureaucratic pushback, and public backlash” may make
it difficult for a president to reverse a course set by a prior president.272
Thus, a strong president “may be frustrated by a federal bureaucracy that is
steeped in routine and prone to inertia and following the dictates of
habit,”273 making “bureaucratic pushback” a potential powerful constraint
on presidential power.274 While some studies suggest that career civil ser-
vants recognize their “subordinate roles as unelected government officials”
and generally comply with the dictates of a new administration, “there is at
least some evidence that bureaucrats in the Trump Administration are de-
parting from these norms.”275 For example, “[r]ogue Twitter accounts by
government employees have lampooned and lambasted the Administration”
on its climate policy.276 To preempt the possibility of political interference,
government employees leaked contrary scientific documents on climate
change, retiring government officials issued “scathing critiques of the
Trump Administration as they retired,” and “close-knit cadres inside agen-
cies as diverse as EPA, the Department of Labor, and the State Department
have covertly organized in preparation for further resistance.”277
So, the path for a president seeking to reverse the policies of his prede-
cessor, like President Obama’s position that issuance of the Keystone XL
Pipeline permit was ill-advised, is not easy. However, resistance in this
form is not always assured. It can be ignored and over-ridden by a presi-
dent’s superior power and position as well as his access to the bully pulpit.
This Part has identified various arguments in support of a dominant
president, such as a president’s prerogative powers, his duty to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed, his inherent authority as Commander-
in-Chief and his inherent authority over foreign affairs, and the assurance
that the courts, Congress, and the public will check any excessive use of
that power. The Part has also shown the weaknesses of those arguments,
although none should be fully discounted.
271. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2314. R
272. Hoshijima, supra note 210, at 239. R
273. Id. at 240 (referring to the Trump Administration’s efforts to reverse the Obama Administra-
tion’s climate policies and saying, “climate-consciousness may be too ingrained to be easily stripped
from the federal bureaucracy. To reinforce this difficulty, agencies may respond imperfectly to presiden-
tial mandates due to habit. Bureaucratic agencies are often defined by regularized and stable practices”).
274. Id. at 241.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 241–42.
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B. Opposition to a Dominant President
On the one hand, a strong president may improve “democratic respon-
siveness by consolidating power in a nationally representative President”;
on the other, it may “erode democratic responsiveness by weakening con-
gressional control of federal departments and agencies.”278 Presidential ad-
ministration, by providing room for agency personnel to make sound scien-
tific and technical decisions, may promote competence; alternatively, it may
erode agency expertise by offering opportunities for “covert” presidential
interference in agency staff work.279 As with support for a dominant presi-
dent, opposition to it is not clear cut.
A strong president can actually “crowd[ ] out agency expertise,”280
especially when a president’s interest in gaining re-election or some other
“political victory” can conflict with expert views’ interests.281 These inter-
ests can lead him “to defer to public or constituency opinion even when ill-
informed or self-interested,” or “to seek near-term results even when doing
so will sacrifice long-term benefits.”282 While close scrutiny of presidential
action, can promote transparency, it may, conversely, empower the presi-
dent to influence agency policy formulation “behind closed doors” and then
give him the freedom to disavow those decisions later, increasing “bureau-
cratic opacity.”283 Inertia, protection from judicial and congressional cor-
rection, and the president’s control of the bully pulpit diminish the possibil-
ity of any fundamental change in a presidentially directed policy initia-
tive.284 Additionally, when “smart policies and regulations” work, they
“become stickier,” and thus harder to reverse, even though there is no con-
gressional imprimatur. Once a lot of “individual and collective steps” have
been taken to implement a certain policy, those policies “lock in” and en-
trench us in moving in their direction.285
As this Part will show, neither Congress nor the courts are especially
effective when it comes to preventing abuses of power by strong presidents
in response to some organized special interest or from presidents violating
constitutional norms, like the separation of powers doctrine. But, un-
checked, expansive presidential power enables successor presidents to re-
verse the initiatives of prior presidents, which may allow the creation of an
278. Hoshijima, supra note 210, at 180–81. R
279. Id. at 181.
280. Id. at 180.
281. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2356. R
282. Id.
283. Hoshijima, supra note 210, at 181. R
284. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2358. R
285. Hoshijima, supra note 210, at 232–33 (quoting President Obama discussing his climate change R
initiatives).
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‘imperial’ Chief Executive “who acts arbitrarily and with few con-
straints.”286
1. Congress and the Courts have Limited Ability to Check Presidential
Abuses of Power
When it comes to limiting the president’s actions, Congress is rela-
tively “frail.”287 Congress has “neither the tools nor the incentives” to block
“wrongful assertions of presidential authority.”288 It is hard for Congress to
get the two-thirds vote in each house to overturn a presidential order.289
This makes Congress an insufficient check on an intemperate president.
While one house of Congress could vote to disapprove of or strip the fund-
ing from some presidential action, as the Court held in INS v. Chadha,290
“the concurrence of the two Houses plus the President is the exclusive
means by which laws are enacted,” means doing that “would have no legal
or practical effect, other than as a protest.”291 Chadha also creates a prob-
lem with inferring any affirmative meaning from legislative acquiescence in
presidential action.292 Even if both Houses joined in the action, unless the
president cooperated, the Presentment Clause or a presidential veto override
would make that action ineffective.293 A vote supporting the president’s
interpretation of some claimed power would be ineffective because only
courts “can issue binding interpretations of law.”294 Committee hearings, in
which members noted that they did not acquiesce in the president’s action
would only have the effect of disputing future claims of “acquiescence by
silence.”295 It would also be futile for members to try and stop the president
286. Id. at 233.
287. Peter L. Strauss, Eroding Checks on Presidential Authority-Norms, the Civil Service, and the
Courts, 94 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 581, 586 (2019) (stating “[i]f not good law, there was worldly wisdom
in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that ‘The tools belong to the man who can use them.’ We may say
that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can
prevent power from slipping through its fingers.”) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson J., concurring)).
288. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2350. R
289. Id.
290. 462 U.S. 919 (1982).
291. Morrison, supra note 168, at 1220, 1224. R
292. Id. at 1220 (asking “[o]r, using Justice Burton’s terminology, by what law or other legally
binding means had Congress ‘reserved for itself’ the power to decide when federal law could be used in
these circumstances to achieve the goals that the President sought? Because there is no statute on point,
it must be the sounds of silence that created these legal limitations. But that would be at least odd, if not
worse, because it would suggest that Congress has more power when it does nothing than when one
House acts as it did in Chadha”).
293. Id. at 1224.
294. Id.
295. Id. According to Morrison, “the sounds of silence begin to be heard when one branch takes
certain actions that trigger what the Court sees as an obligation to respond by the other, lest silence be
construed as acquiescence.” Id. at 1218; see also Id. at 1221 (stating “Justice Frankfurter agreed that
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by suing him, because courts have shown increasing reluctance to grant
members of Congress standing in these cases.296
A president’s broad supervisory powers, which enable him to insert
policy considerations into administrative agency initiatives, like rulemak-
ings, limit the practical effectiveness of any constraints on his direct ac-
tion.297 In fact, there are “few forms of presidential pressure that are
‘clearly out of bounds,’”298 which leaves room for potential presidential
shenanigans.
“The difficulty Congress faces in resisting these presidential efforts
factors into the calculus that makes active involvement in, and even dicta-
tion of, administrative outcomes so attractive to Presidents.”299 But, al-
lowing presidents to engage in such behavior “undermine[s] Congress’s in-
stitutional interests.”300 A statute that clearly delegates to the head of an
agency that it is to be the decision-maker should be read that way because
any contrary interpretation “would displace the agency head’s discre-
tion.”301 “After all, what is the point of delegating power to an agency head
if it can be displaced?”302
Justice Kagan’s argument in response is that one should not “assume
Congress intends to protect its institutional prerogatives,”303 runs counter to
institutional behavior, which is generally self-protective of the institution’s
prerogatives.304 In addition, Justice Kagan’s argument that Congress fre-
quently fails to protect its institutional interests does not mean that it never
consistent executive action, to which Congress did not object, could put a ‘gloss’ on the statute that
permitted the executive to act as it had done before. In that particular case, however, the Justice found
that there were an insufficient number of comparable actions to warrant inferring the gloss”).
296. Id. at 1224 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997)).
297. Hoshijima, supra note 210, at 238. R
298. Id.
299. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2309. R
300. Sargentich, et al., supra note 166, at 22; see also Kagan, supra note 10, at 2352 (stating that R
“enhanced presidential control of administration becomes a political substitute for the nondelegation
doctrine, pressuring Congress to take increased responsibility for initial policy choices, but without
relying on judicial intervention”). See Id. at 2365 (stating that “[t]he doctrine as applied thus expresses,
albeit tenuously, some special suspicion of the President as a policymaker”); see also Id. at 2369 (stating
that “all else equal, administrative action taken pursuant to a delegation to an agency official, but clothed
with the imprimatur and authority of the President, should receive maximum protection against a
nondelegation challenge. The President’s involvement, at least if publicly disclosed, vests the action
with an increased dose of accountability, which although not (by definition) peculiarly legislative in
nature, renders the action less troublesome than solely bureaucratic measures from the standpoint of
democratic values”).
301. Sargentich, et al., supra note 166, at 24. R
302. Id.
303. Id. at 22 (citing Kagan, supra note 10, at 2230).
304. But see Id. at 22 (asking “why should we assume that congress intends to protect its institu-
tional prerogatives?”).
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does.305 Indeed, why would any member of Congress “want to undermine
the relative power of their own committees vis-a`-vis agencies, which would
be the predictable effect of assigning directive power over executive branch
rulemaking to the President who is, as Kagan recognizes, ‘Congress’s prin-
cipal competitor for power in Washington?’”306 When Congress is con-
trolled by the opposite party, a president assuming an administrative activ-
ity “sounds a very loud ‘fire alarm’ to a Congress controlled by the other
party.”307 Congress may respond to such action with “hearings, harassment,
and threats of sanction.”308 These may be “distributed unevenly” and may
focus on those presidential activities that it can control more easily, like the
budget.309
Congress can use its power to “veto” a serious instance of a presiden-
tial abuse of power, such as intemperately declaring a national emergency
where there is none. But a congressional veto “is politically a weak device
for controlling the President . . . a blunt instrument, too extreme to be used
except in response to the most egregious presidential abuses.”310 If there is
any appearance of a dangerous situation, public opinion may prevent Con-
gress from acting, making the prospect of a congressional veto a “useless”
check on a president who uses “the existence of an emergency as a pretext
for overreaching.”311 Even if the declaration of an emergency is a pretext,
as arguably it is in the case of the Keystone XL Pipeline presidential permit,
Congress may have a hard time “directly contradicting the President, whose
office and access to the media give him vast powers to define issues and
influence public opinion.”312
Justice Kagan’s description of the ineffectiveness of Congress’ over-
sight of agency action and the reasons for it are equally, if not more applica-
ble to its oversight of the president. So Justice Kagan’s explanation of why
Congress’s oversight of agencies is ineffectual—that Congress “rarely is
held accountable for agency decisions” and congressional oversight re-
quires both collective action and presidential acquiescence—makes uncer-
tain Congress’s interest in overseeing administrative action and “its capac-
ity to control agency discretion restricted.”313 In fact, congressional over-
305. Id.
306. Id. at 23.
307. Hoshijima, supra note 210, at 228. R
308. Id.
309. Id. (stating that “[t]he most concerted congressional attacks on the fourth pillar centered on
programs that Congress could easily shape through its budgetary powers: the DOD’s climate-conscious-
ness efforts and federally funded climate change science”); Kagan, supra note 10, at 2347 (describing R
hearings, harassment, and threats of sanction as the key congressional tools).
310. Presidential Emergency Power, supra note 152, at 1118. R
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2347. R
43
Babcock: Issuance of the Keystone XL Permit
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2020
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON102.txt unknown Seq: 44 31-MAR-20 9:31
48 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 81
sight activity with respect to agency action diminishes to the extent that the
president is actively involved in it.314 “In these circumstances, presidential
powers—particularly the veto—will loom large in any congressional over-
sight effort of the President; as Congress discovered during both Reagan’s
and Clinton’s tenures, it cannot often marshal the resources necessary to
overturn administrative action backed by a resolute (because responsible)
President.”315 In fact, once the president begins to engage in unilateral ac-
tion over administrative agencies, Congress often will cede the field:
“[R]ather than protesting, representatives are relieved that they can evade
political responsibility for making hard decisions.”316 But the empirically
supported counter argument posits that when a president starts to direct ad-
ministrative agencies Congress will be goaded “into increased oversight ac-
tivity: ‘By raising the stakes for other actors in the system, such hegemonis-
tic claims may trigger an oversight arms race.’”317 So the effectiveness of
congressional oversight over a president is not clear—Congress may (or
may not) be able to curtail presidential excesses.
With respect to the judicial branch, a court is “seldom willing, even
with an overwhelming body of constitutional precedent behind it, to stand
against a united front of the legislative and executive branches.”318 This
reluctance carries forward to protect the president when he exercises emer-
gency powers. While emergencies “do not create power,” they can create
circumstances in which dormant powers may be used.319 Courts are in-
clined to find sufficient latitude in the Constitution to allow “almost any
conceivable congressional delegation of emergency powers to the executive
. . . a residue of ‘domestic prerogative,’ a body of inherent presidential
powers which may be utilized in domestic emergencies.”320 Hence a court
reviewing President Trump’s use of a national emergency to justify his issu-
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 2348.
317. Id. (stating that “the advent of presidential administration roughly coincided with an increase in
visible congressional oversight”).
318. Roche, supra note 5, at 595; see also Id. at 597 (arguing that “[t]he Supreme Court then will R
rarely, if ever, attempt to frustrate the exercise of real political power; and, since in the United States
real political power normally is shared between the President and Congress, the Court has shown great
respect for emergency powers given to the President by Congress no matter what constitutional sub-
stance may be involved”).
319. Id.
320. Id.; see also Johnsen, supra note 188, at 374–75 (stating that “In his first State of the Union
address, he [Roosevelt] said, ‘[M]eans must be found to adapt our legal forms and our judicial interpre-
tation to the actual present national needs of the largest progressive democracy in the modem world.’ He
reportedly said that when he took the presidential oath of office and swore to uphold the Constitution, ‘I
felt like saying, ‘Yes, but it’s the Constitution as I understand it, flexible enough to meet any new
problems of democracy-not the kind of Constitution your Court has raised up as a barrier to progress and
democracy’”).
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ance of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit may not be troubled at all by his
actions—“as new problems create new constitutional needs, the Constitu-
tion is found by the philosopher-Justices to contain adequate instruments to
deal with emergent requirements.”321
Peter Strauss identifies another problem with relying on courts to
check an untethered president—“the President’s insulation from normal
forms of judicial control.”322 Presidential actions pursuant to a direct con-
gressional delegation, are largely unreviewable,323 unless they raise consti-
tutional issues.324 In a case challenging the President’s action vis-a`-vis the
Keystone XL Pipeline permit, Sisseton v. United States Department of
State,325 a United States District Court said with respect to redressability:
“[e]ven if the most egregious violations of the NHPA and NEPA have oc-
curred, which they have not, plaintiffs are asking the court to direct the
Department [of State] to ‘suspend and/or revoke the Presidential permit.’
However, even if the court were to do so, the President would still be free to
issue the permit again under his inherent Constitutional authority to conduct
foreign policy on behalf of the nation.”326
Similarly, in NRDC v. United States Department of State,327 another
challenge to the permit, the court said that “agency action pursuant to a
delegation of the President’s inherent constitutional authority over foreign
affairs is tantamount to an action by the President himself.”328 The State
Department was acting solely on behalf of the President, exercising his
purely Presidential prerogatives.329 Since the president is not an agency,
presidential action is not subject to judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”).330 This served to insulate the State Department’s
321. Roche, supra note 5, at 597. R
322. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2350. R
323. See Parker, supra note 13, at 238 (stating that “[t]wo federal district courts have deemed the R
final decision, regardless if it is made by DOS or the President, unreviewable.”); see also Id. at 233
(arguing that “[i]f DOS’s decision to grant the Presidential permit is not reviewable by the courts be-
cause the President retains contingent authority, DOS’s decision is shielded from scrutiny. Then, the
agency decision may be driven entirely by political motives, rather than by a transparent, careful, and
informed decisionmaking process”).
324. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2368 (“Presidential action occurring under a direct delegation usually R
is insulated from legal challenge, except when the challenge is constitutional in nature.”). See also Id. at
2351 (stating that “the Supreme Court held in Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992) that the
President is not an ‘agency’ as defined in the APA and his actions therefore are not subject to the
judicial review provisions of that statute,” noting the case arose from a challenge to an action that
Congress had committed to the sole discretion of the President, separate from and subsequent to agency
involvement”).
325. 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D.S.D. 2009).
326. Parker, supra note 13, at 248 (citing Sisseton, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1078). R
327. 658 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2009).
328. Id. at 109.
329. Parker, supra note 13, at 251 (citing NRDC, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 109). R
330. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800 (1992).
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actions because it was acting for the President, when it decided to suspend
its review of the permit.331 The NRDC Court reasoned that “because the
President could always use his authority to direct the agency or even revoke
the delegation of authority for it to issue permits, the decision must be
‘presidential.’ At a minimum, the President must ‘acquiesce’ to the agency
decision, which makes the process Presidential enough to be unreview-
able.”332
In a third case, Sierra Club v. Clinton,333 plaintiffs challenged the suf-
ficiency of an EIS under NEPA and the APA, as well as the constitutional-
ity of the presidential permitting process and withstood motions to dismiss
both those claims but lost their claim that the permit was unconstitu-
tional.334 But, none of the three courts questioned the President’s inherent
authority to issue permits for cross-border pipelines in the absence of a
congressional regulatory scheme governing the construction of oil pipe-
lines.335
With regard to the reviewability of a presidential permit, “[e]ven
though the President’s retention of final decision-making authority is con-
tingent upon this specific event of performing a tiebreaker between the Sec-
retary of State and another agency head, courts hearing cases with facts
similar to those of the Keystone XL Pipeline have interpreted paragraph (i)
as being the sort of retention of final decision-making authority that the
Supreme Court discussed in Franklin—the kind that precludes any re-
view.”336 “A subsequent case, Dalton v. Specter,337 confirmed the holding
in Franklin,” that the President’s actions are not judicially reviewable under
the APA, but also “explained that the President’s actions, at least those not
taken pursuant to statutory authority, could be reviewed for constitutional-
ity,” as the “Constitution grants, or at least does not deny, the President
authority in various arenas. One of those arenas is to regulate foreign af-
fairs.”338
Justice Kagan argues the reverse with respect to the reviewability of a
president’s action under the APA. She contends that when a president di-
331. Parker, supra note 13, at 251; see also Campau, supra note 24, at 289 (stating that “the few R
courts that addressed this issue have held that the broad decision of whether to grant a presidential
permit is unreviewable under the APA because such a decision is either: a) ‘presidential’ in nature or b)
lacking finality”).
332. Parker, supra note 13, at 251–52. R
333. 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Minn. 2010).
334. Id. at1151–52, 1163.
335. Parker, supra note 13, at 253 (citing Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 659 F. R
Supp. 2d 1071,1078 (D.S.D. 2009); NDRC v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 658 F. Supp. 2d 105, 106 (D.D.C.
2009); Sierra Club, 689 F. Supp. 2d at 1155).
336. Id. at 245.
337. 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
338. Parker, supra note 13, at 243. R
46
Montana Law Review, Vol. 81 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON102.txt unknown Seq: 47 31-MAR-20 9:31
2020 ISSUANCE OF THE KEYSTONE XL PERMIT 51
rects an action Congress has delegated to an agency, “the President effec-
tively has stepped into the shoes of an agency head, and the review provi-
sions usually applicable to that agency’s action should govern.”339 She also
maintains that courts, to the extent that they are receptive to legal chal-
lenges to presidential action, are able to prevent a presidential directive
from displacing “too greatly” the preferences of at least a prior Congress,
compared to a current “overseeing” one, “with respect to agency action.”340
However, she concedes that the “Court has held that presidential action
is not reviewable under the APA for claims of statutory violations; and
although formally reserving the issue whether review is available outside
the APA framework, the Court has suggested firmly that presidential ac-
tions claimed to follow from either constitutional or statutory authority ‘em-
body Presidential discretion as to political matters beyond the competence
of the courts to adjudicate.’”341 Justice Kagan also argues for diminished
review of presidential action when “demonstrable evidence shows that the
President has taken an active role in, and by so doing has accepted responsi-
bility for, the administrative decision in question.”342 Her only requirement
is that the President “disclose publicly and in advance” his contribution to
the ultimate action.343 Here, where there is no question about presidential
involvement in the issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit, if she is
right on its reviewability, Justice Kagan’s diminished review approach
would apply.
A final possible check on the president abusing his Article II powers is
the people. Popular consensus can play an important role in limiting the
actions of a president.344 Community consensus can play an important role
in limiting the actions of a president.345 Roche interprets Youngstown as
339. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2351. R
340. Id.
341. Id. at 2369.
342. Id. at 2380; see also Id. at 2377 (stating that “courts could apply Chevron [deference] when, but
only when, presidential involvement rises to a certain level of substantiality, as manifested in executive
orders and directives, rulemaking records, and other objective indicia of decisionmaking processes”).
343. Id. at 2382 (arguing that “[t]he critical matter is less the form than the fact of candid and public
acknowledgment of the presidential role in shaping an administrative decision”).
344. Roche, supra note 5, at 618 (arguing that “[w]hile all students of government appreciate the R
complexities of presidential existence in the United States, and most will admit that the President re-
quires a high degree of discretion and autonomy for the proper exercise of his function, it is also impor-
tant that a line be drawn between responsible autonomy and irresponsible autonomy. While it is no easy
task to draw this line, its general outline should follow the boundary between community consensus and
elitist conviction”).
345. Id. (arguing that “[w]hile all students of government appreciate the complexities of presidential
existence in the United States, and most will admit that the President requires a high degree of discretion
and autonomy for the proper exercise of his function, it is also important that a line be drawn between
responsible autonomy and irresponsible autonomy. While it is no easy task to draw this line, its general
outline should follow the boundary between community consensus and elitist conviction”).
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reaffirming the importance of community control, saying “[w]hether [the
Court’s] interpretation of the reality of the emergency is correct or not only
time will reveal, but in the contemporary context the Court insisted that the
view of the American community prevail over the views of government
experts. In so doing, the Court insisted on the primacy of discussion, of
pragmatic blunderings and successes, over expertise and autonomous in-
sight.”346
Roche’s discussion of the role of community focuses on the debate
among the Justices of whether there was an emergency that justified Presi-
dent Truman’s actions.347 He suggests that “this argument over premises
[whether or not an emergency existed] is not one that can be solved by the
process of legal ratiocination, but rather it must be determined through judi-
cial insight into the attitudes and opinions of the American community-
particularly as reflected in the views of congressmen.”348 Going further,
Roche states that this determination “is essentially a problem in social psy-
chology, not in law.”349 The process of consensus is important to the sur-
vival of democratic governments, which, in turn, validates the “viability of
government by discussion,” and “the view that for better or for worse dem-
ocratic executives must accept, or be compelled to accept, restraint of their
insights and prerogatives.”350
Indeed, one reason that Justice Kagan is not worried about the poten-
tial for the president to engage in nefarious acts is because the president is
accountable to the public; that accountability serves to keep presidential
exuberance “in check by mooring it to current or at least potential public
opinion.”351 She reasons that the “potential for this sharpened democratic
scrutiny should help, in the first instance, to keep the President’s exercise of
authority within healthy parameters.”352
However, the effectiveness of this check on presidential excesses only
works if the president is “transparent” in his methods, creating “the poten-
346. Id.
347. Id. at 617 (stating that “[t]he legal arguments between the two divisions of the Court were
consequently of little significance; the vital disagreement was over premises. Granted the assumption
that no emergency existed, the majority view fell into the tradition of limitation. Granted the assumption
that an emergency existed, the minority opinion fell into an equally well-defined tradition of judicial
restraint”).
348. Id.
349. Id. (arguing that “[a]n emergency is-like the middle class-more a state of mind than an objective
socio-political phenomenon”).
350. Roche, supra note 5, at 618. R
351. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2345–46. R
352. Id. at 2349; see also Roche, supra note 5, at 616 (“Thus in Jackson’s opinion [Youngstown R
Sheet & Tube], the critical point was not that presidential autonomy violated the principle of the separa-
tion of powers, but that irresponsible presidential autonomy, prerogative exercise which did not have its
foundation in the democratic process, did breach a basic principle of American constitutionalism: that
the actions of the executive must be based on community consensus”).
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tial for slack between his actions and the public’s revealed or shaped prefer-
ences.”353 And a president has many ways to hide what he does from the
public and is beyond the reach of information disclosing statutes, like the
Freedom of Information Act,354 even though his office is not.355 So trans-
parency may be difficult to achieve when it applies to presidential acts,
undermining any ability for the public to act as a check on the president.
2. The Potential for Dominant Presidents to Violate Constitutional
Norms
President Trump’s assumption of the State Department’s role in issu-
ing presidential permits for cross-border energy facilities is an example of a
president either usurping a congressionally delegated function to an admin-
istrative agency or engaging in lawmaking to the extent that the President’s
action, in effect, amended Section 501 of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut
Continuation Act of 2011 by adding language rescinding Executive Orders
11,423 and 13,337. “Basic separation of powers doctrine maintains that
Congress must authorize presidential exercises of essentially lawmaking
functions.”356 Here, Congress affirmed the delegation of discretionary au-
thority to issue the Keystone XL Pipeline permit to the State Department by
specifically incorporating that delegation in statutory text. By taking on sole
responsibility for this authority, President Trump “exceed[ed] the appropri-
ate bounds of his office.”357
“The system of checks and balances established in the Constitution is
in no small measure based upon it: James Madison’s famed prescription of
‘ambition . . . counteracting ambition’ was designed to generate a kind of
friction that would make governmental deliberation extensive and govern-
mental action difficult to accomplish.”358 Accordingly, “institutional ar-
rangements promoting dynamic government, such as the presidential con-
trol of bureaucracy, pose a risk of both tyranny and instability that should
not be tolerated.”359 “[T]he muscular nature of the governmental action,”
here the issuance of a permit by the President instead of by a line agency,
“portends excessive departures from status quo ordering.”360 However, Jus-
tice Kagan points to a “counter-tradition,” one calling for “enhanced gov-
353. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2346 (stating that “the real question about presidential control is not R
whether it should exist to the exclusion of all other influences on administration, but whether within an
inevitably pluralist system, the President should possess the strongest possible weapons”).
354. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
355. Id. § 552(f).
356. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2319. R
357. Id. at 2320.
358. Id. at 2342.
359. Id.
360. Id.
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ernmental, and in particular executive, vigor. At the core of this tradition is
Hamilton’s vision of a strong and efficacious government, with leadership
provided by a chief executive operating with ‘decision’ and ‘dispatch.’”361
To Justice Kagan, reflecting Hamilton’s view, a system of checks and bal-
ances should not effect a moderating effect on the executive; rather it
should create and then concentrate “certain powers in an executive capable
of resolute action.”362
Regardless of whether one views the system of checks and balances as
having a moderating or energizing effect on presidents, the system had the
potential for what Bruce Ackerman calls “crises in governability, produced
by the inability of the executive and legislative branches to cooperate in
exercising their shared powers.”363 The modern phenomenon of divided
government, recently driven by polarization between the political parties,
has led to the decline in Congress’s capacity to engage in collective action
to meet national needs: “partisan differences” have been “superimposed on
institutional differences,” leading to “the phenomenon (and, indeed, by now
the cliche´) of gridlock.”364 The result is that the ability of Congress to check
the president is vanishing in the modern era. Any further unbalancing to the
power distribution between Congress and the president by increasing the
president’s powers threatens to destroy the Constitution’s institutional
structure in the near, and even long, term.
Manning and Goldsmith make the argument that “Article II of the
Constitution should be understood to provide the President with a ‘comple-
tion power,’ which enables him ‘to prescribe incidental details needed to
carry into execution a legislative scheme, even in the absence of congres-
sional authorization to complete that scheme.’”365 They argue that that
power is “defeasible” because Congress can limit its use by specifying in
the statute how it is to be implemented.366 This so-called “completion
power” contributes to an understanding of “the broad enforcement discre-
361. Id. at 2342–43.
362. Id. at 2343.
363. Id. at 2343–44.
364. Id. at 2344 (arguing that “[t]hese new circumstances create a need for institutional reforms that
will strengthen the President’s ability to provide energetic leadership in an inhospitable political envi-
ronment”). Justice Kagan goes on to note that the administrative system became increasingly rigid at
roughly the same time, reducing the capacity of agencies to innovate and increasing their “tendency to
do what they always have done even in the face of dramatic changes in needs, circumstances, and
priorities.” Courts contributed to this “ossification” by increasing procedural requirements in response to
the participation of interest groups in the administrative process. Id. (arguing that “[t]he combination has
made torpor a defining feature of administrative agencies, resulting both in inadequate and in overzeal-
ous regulatory efforts”).
365. Glen Staszewski, Textualism and the Executive Branch, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 171–72
(2009).
366. Id. at 172.
50
Montana Law Review, Vol. 81 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol81/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-1\MON102.txt unknown Seq: 51 31-MAR-20 9:31
2020 ISSUANCE OF THE KEYSTONE XL PERMIT 55
tion that is accorded to the executive branch and the judiciary’s practice of
deferring to reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions by
executive branch agencies.”367 But, exercising “completion power” by fill-
ing a statutory gap with incidental powers is a far cry from claiming a
power that Congress has not authorized, and, in fact, has allowed to have
been specifically delegated to an administrative agency, as is the case here.
Furthermore, it would be a surprise if the president “had significant
unspecified powers beyond those that the Constitution enumerates for Con-
gress, especially because of the limitation in the Necessary & Proper
Clause.”368 It is Congress, not the president that the Clause authorizes to
“make all Laws necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States.”369 Given the power allocation structure of the Constitution, while
the president has some inherent powers flowing from his “express powers,”
they are unlikely to be extensive.370
However, the Constitution does not answer the “ultimate presidential
powers question,” whether the president “can exercise any power that is
granted to the federal government, unless he is told that he cannot, or
whether he is limited in what he can do, which means he has mainly the
powers granted him by Congress or expressly by the Constitution itself,
with a penumbra extending only slightly beyond the powers specified.”371
So, unless Congress told him he could not issue the permit for the Keystone
XL Pipeline, he could do it as he was merely exercising his completion
power to fill a gap left by Congress that executive orders filled with a direc-
tion to a federal agency.
Here, Congress only directed President Obama to complete the permit
review process within sixty days. It incorporated key provisions from those
two executive orders that direct the President to act through the State De-
partment when he issues trans-border permits for energy facilities and set
out the requirements that apply to that process. If there is an argument that
President Trump was only exercising this completion power when he issued
the permit, arguably he has gone beyond the penumbra of that power in his
failure to abide by the dictates of the executive orders. His actions either
illegally suspended Section 501 of the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continu-
ation Act of 2011, or engaged in a lawmaking activity by amending that law
367. Id.
368. Morrison, supra note 166, at 1232. R
369. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 1234. Morrison notes, but does not elaborate on the significance of the fact that Congress
frequently authorizes the president to do something, but “almost never includes prohibitory language in
a statute.” Id. at 1213.
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to rescind those executive orders in violation of the separation of powers
doctrine.
The ambiguity of the answer to Morrison’s question about the scope of
the president’s power will be a temptation to dominant presidents, like Pres-
ident Trump, to try and usurp legislative power. This will be especially true,
as the ability of Congress, the courts, and the public to stop him is close to
non-existent.
VI. CONCLUSION
When general concerns about dominant presidents are folded into the
specific circumstances of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit, then the dan-
gers from President Trump’s issuance of the permit become even more ap-
parent. These concerns arise not only because of the specific permit’s po-
tential to cause substantial adverse environmental harm, but also because of
the possibility it may become a permanent way to avoid environmental ac-
countability for what may turn out to be destructive future projects as well
as serve as a rationale for future presidents to behave in a similar, intemper-
ate way.
The arguments by advocates of a strong presidency exaggerate the
abilities of the courts, Congress, and the public to protect national interests
from over-zealous presidents, who can be as interested as members of Con-
gress in protecting their reelection and place in history and hence beholden
to special, not national, interests. A self-empowered president who fails to
respect institutional and constitutional norms, as President Trump has done
in issuing the Keystone XL Pipeline permit, threatens those norms and the
balanced constitutional structure of our government. The gains of effi-
ciency, a way to end congressional deadlock, and improved administrative
accountability, touted by Justice Kagan as an advantage of a dominant pres-
ident, seem less persuasive in the context of the chimeric nature of presi-
dential transparency and subservience to the will of Congress.
Thus, President Trump’s issuance of the Keystone XL Pipeline permit
to facilitate the cross-border development of a project of dubious need, but
with the potential for significant environmental harm, becomes a stalking
horse for constitutional transgressions by future presidents. While the per-
mit is troublesome in its own right, what it portends for the future balance
of powers among the three branches of government is deeply troubling,
especially in the current era, in which one party has been able to co-opt all
three branches to bend to its will.
The desirability of a strong president depends on the “contents” of that
leadership; “energy is beneficial when placed in the service of meritorious
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policies, threatening when associated with the opposite.”372 Thus, there is a
need to “preserve an appreciation of richly divergent perspectives in a
world of checks and balances, in which no single hierarchical voice should
be seen to overcome all others. Of course, nothing can guarantee a rich
polyphony—but at least we can keep from being totally drowned out by the
unifying voices of our age,”373 or, in current times, by a single voice.
372. Kagan, supra note 10, at 2341; see also Id. at 2341, n.365 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 R
(Alexander Hamilton)) (arguing that “[e]nergy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of
good government’”).
373. Sargentich, et al., supra note 166, at 36. R
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